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This dissertation explores quantitative implications of heterogeneity in price
stickiness and contractual vulnerability within an open economy context. Partic-
ular attention is given to the effects of these frictions on sectoral variables during
economic downturns.
Chapter 1 documents that U.S. producer prices of differentiated goods barely
moved in recent recessions, while the declines in industrial production were large.
In contrast, for nondifferentiated goods, large producer price reductions were ac-
companied by relatively small adjustments in production. Similar patterns have
been found in international trade data on prices and quantities. I use a two-country
general equilibrium model with trade in nondifferentiated and differentiated goods
to shed light on the reasons behind these sectoral differences. I focus on two mech-
anisms: sector-specific nominal rigidities and endogenous variable markups at the
producer level. The calibration of the main parameters of the model is based on
micro data and national accounts data. The impulse responses of relative prices and
quantities to a monetary shock are compared with empirical vector autoregressions,
showing a good match. These responses can largely be explained by heterogeneity
in the frequency of price adjustment, while the variable markup channel is quanti-
tatively less important.
Chapter 2, co-written with Renzo Castellares, starts from the observation that
some products are more sensitive to imperfect contracting than others. Hence, indus-
tries exhibit different degrees of contractual vulnerability. We build a simple theory
in which: (i) exporters are paid after delivery of the goods, and (ii) a complementar-
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the model’s predictions. The estimated sectoral effects are statistically significant
and economically important. Our analysis employs different industry measures of
contractual vulnerability, including a novel indicator that reflects payment defaults
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Chapter 1: A Tale of Two Sectors: Product Differentiation and Het-
erogeneity in Price Stickiness in a General Equilibrium
Model
1.1 Introduction
A consistent finding across empirical studies in the closed and open econ-
omy literature is that relatively raw products or “nondifferentiated goods” exhibit
a smaller degree of price stickiness than more processed products or “differenti-
ated goods” (Gordon, 1990; Bils and Klenow, 2004; Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008;
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). This evidence suggests that, all else equal, a con-
ventional monetary model with sticky prices would predict: first, a larger decline in
prices of nondifferentiated goods relative to those of differentiated goods following
a contractionary demand shock, and second, a reduction in the relative quantities
consumed/produced of differentiated goods to nondifferentiated goods (see e.g. Bils
et al., 2003). An implication of these theoretical predictions is that, under some
qualifications, the heterogeneity in price stickiness across sectors could help ex-
plain the evidence of larger declines among trade quantities of differentiated goods
than among nondifferentiated goods during recent recessions (Haddad et al., 2010;
1
Gopinath et al., 2012).1
Motivated by the above discussion, this paper emphasizes the dichotomy be-
tween sectors producing nondifferentiated and differentiated manufactured goods,
and investigates how the relative prices and quantities across these sectors respond
to an explicitly identified aggregate demand shock. In the empirical section, I use
monthly U.S. data at the industry level to construct measures of domestic and trade
prices and quantities for nondifferentiated and differentiated goods. I then estimate
vector autoregressions to generate impulse response functions of relative prices and
quantities across sectors to a contractionary monetary policy shock. The theoretical
section of the paper uses an open economy general equilibrium model calibrated to
U.S. data to shed light on the extent to which two potential sources of heterogene-
ity in price stickiness—sector-specific nominal rigidities and endogenous variable
markups—can rationalize quantitatively the sectoral differences in responses to a
monetary shock observed in the data.
The empirical section of the paper exploits the Rauch (1999) classification to
categorize disaggregated industries as producers of nondifferentiated and differen-
tiated goods. Rauch (1999) distinguishes products traded on organized exchanges,
goods with reference prices (quoted in trade publications), and differentiated goods
or “branded” products without a reference price. Armed with this classification,
I compute aggregated measures of domestic prices and quantities (using producer
price indices and industrial production indices), and trade prices and quantities
1See e.g. Alessandria et al. (2010), Eaton et al. (2011), and the survey in Bems et al. (2013)
for theories on the so-called Great Trade Collapse of 2008–2009. None of them considers the
empirically relevant distinction between nondifferentiated and differentiated goods in an explicit
way, nor do they model heterogeneity in price stickiness.
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(using at-the-dock data on unit values and volumes of exports and imports) for
nondifferentiated and differentiated goods sectors. The empirical findings validate
the aforementioned intuition that quantities adjust the least in the nondifferentiated
goods sector, where prices are most responsive. I show that this result holds for do-
mestic and trade data during recessions. A similar result holds for impulse responses
to a monetary policy shock. This shock is identified in vector autoregressions by
means of the recursiveness assumption used by Christiano et al. (1999).
To explain the empirical evidence, I introduce heterogeneity in price stickiness
in a two-country multisector model that includes an aggregate nominal demand
shock. This framework features manufacturing firms operating under monopolistic
competition in two tradable sectors—nondifferentiated and differentiated goods—
and a nontradable goods sector. The production sectors coexist with perfectly com-
petitive retail and distribution sectors. Nominal rigidities among the monopolis-
tically competitive producers take the form of time-dependent Calvo price-setting.
I consider differences in the frequency of price changes across sectors, in line with
microeconomic evidence on price setting. In addition, following Corsetti and Dedola
(2005), retail prices include a distribution-cost component. As a result, the produc-
ers’ price elasticities of demand, and hence their optimal markups, are endogenous
and depend on the cost of production relative to the local distribution costs. By
allowing for different intensities in the use of distribution services across sectors,
the variable markups constitute a second source of heterogeneity in price stickiness
(on top of the nominal rigidities). My modeling choices for nominal rigidities and
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variable markups facilitate tractability and allow for a straightforward calibration.2
Using input-output data for the U.S., I document that the share of distribution
costs in the retail price is higher for differentiated goods than for nondifferentiated
goods. This result is intuitive since distribution costs include, for example, mar-
keting and advertising services. The model then implies that markups are more
variable among differentiated goods relative to nondifferentiated goods; therefore,
the prices of the former are less sensitive to changes in marginal costs, but more
sensitive to changes in distribution costs, than those of the latter. The calibra-
tion of the distribution-cost shares also generates a lower long-run exchange rate
pass-through into import prices of differentiated goods relative to nondifferentiated
goods, as observed in the data (Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2010).3
To examine the model’s quantitative predictions, I compute impulse responses
of sectoral domestic and trade variables to a tightening monetary shock. The shock
is correlated across countries and generates endogenous movements in the exchange
rate. The main results are as follows. First, the model-based impulse responses of
the relative prices and quantities across nondifferentiated and differentiated goods
match the VAR-based impulse responses reasonably well, in terms of sign and mag-
nitude. Second, from a quantitative perspective, the key mechanism that drives the
model’s predictions on sectoral prices and quantities is the nominal rigidity channel,
2In the model, the two tradable sectors also differ in their elasticity of substitution between
varieties. This difference is not quantitatively important for the main results.
3For evidence on variable markups at the producer (or wholesale) level, see Gopinath and
Itskhoki (2011). The recent empirical literature on (incomplete) exchange rate pass-through that
uses firm-level data highlights the role of variable markups in offsetting the effect of exchange rate
movements on trade prices at the dock (De Loecker et al., 2012; Amiti et al., 2014; Fitzgerald and
Haller, 2014). My model abstracts from other factors that are typically invoked in that literature,
such as decreasing returns to scale and imported inputs (see e.g. Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2008).
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that is, the differences in durations of producer prices across sectors. This second
result is driven by the calibrated differences in price durations across sectors, produc-
ers reset prices every 3 months (on average), whereas differentiated goods producers
reset prices every 14 months. These calibration targets rely on recent micro-data
evidence for the U.S. I find a relatively less important role for the variable markup
channel.
1.2 Related literature
This paper is related to the existing empirical literature on price rigidities and
the sectoral effects of monetary policy shocks in a closed economy (see e.g. Bils
et al., 2003; Balke and Wynne, 2007; Boivin et al., 2009; Baumeister et al., 2013;
and Kaufmann and Lein, 2013). It is more closely related to Balke and Wynne
(2007) and Boivin et al. (2009) in that they also study data on producer prices,
as opposed to consumer prices. As in Boivin et al. (2009) and Baumeister et al.
(2013), I find evidence that quantities react the least in sectors where prices react
the most. My work differs in that I explicitly distinguish between nondifferentiated
and differentiated goods, and in that I analyze international trade prices in addition
to domestic prices.
Other papers have studied the sectoral implications of heterogeneity in price
setting using sticky-price multi-sector monetary models (Bouakez et al., 2009, 2014;
Carvalho and Lee, 2011).4 Employing a less restrictive framework than mine (with
4Previous studies distinguish between durable and nondurable goods (Barsky et al., 2007; Erceg
and Levin, 2006). Another related strand of literature focuses on the role of price heterogeneity in
aggregate dynamics, such as Carvalho (2006) who studies the real effects of monetary policy, and
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additional features such as input-output production linkages), Bouakez et al. (2014)
conclude that heterogeneity in price stickiness is the primary factor explaining the
differences in responses of sectoral prices and outputs to a monetary shock. In
the same vein, my results indicate that heterogeneity in the sectoral frequency of
price adjustment generates quantitatively important differences in the responses of
prices and quantities across the analyzed sectors. None of those papers, however,
focuses on the distinction between nondifferentiated and differentiated goods, nor
do they consider variable markups based on additive distribution costs. Further,
those papers do not consider predictions for international trade variables.
In parallel work, Bergin and Corsetti (2014) also construct and calibrate a two-
country general equilibrium monetary model with trade in nondifferentiated and
differentiated goods. In their model, the nondifferentiated goods sector produces
commodity-type products and operates under perfect competition, while manufac-
turing firms are located exclusively in the (monopolistically competitive) differenti-
ated goods sector. They also incorporate sunk entry costs in the differentiated goods
sector, as well as sectoral productivity shocks. Their goal is to show that monetary
policy affects the pattern of country specialization between nondifferentiated and
differentiated goods.5
By modeling price rigidities à la Calvo, I do not endogenize the reason why the
frequency of price adjustment is higher for nondifferentiated than for differentiated
goods. Other papers offer insights on this point. Neiman (2011) considers a partial
in an open economy context, Carvalho and Nechio (2011) who study the real exchange rate.
5My model also shares some features with Cravino (2014), in that he incorporates nominal
rigidities and variable markups in an open economy setting. However, Cravino considers a single
tradable sector and focuses on the effects of exchange rate movements on aggregate productivity.
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equilibrium model of trade that endogenizes the relationship between elasticity of
demand and price rigidity in a menu-cost setting. Gordon (1990) suggests that
the prices of more differentiated goods embody relatively large amounts of labor,
implying a role for wage rigidity.6 Finally, Boivin et al. (2009) find empirically that
a higher degree of price flexibility following a monetary shock is explained by a lower
degree of sectoral market power, as measured by gross profit rates, and by a larger
volatility of sector-specific shocks. In the context of my paper, we would indeed
expect nondifferentiated goods to exhibit both relatively low market power, due to
a higher elasticity of substitution, and relatively volatile idiosyncratic shocks due to
their high commodity content.
1.3 Empirical evidence: sectoral prices and quantities
This section uses monthly disaggregated data on U.S. manufacturing producer
prices and industrial production to establish a number of stylized facts. I group
industries into sectors producing nondifferentiated and differentiated goods. Special
attention is paid to the patterns exhibited by sectoral prices and production during
recessions. I also survey related evidence from international trade data. Finally, I
estimate vector autoregressions (VARs) to analyze the impact of monetary policy
shocks on relative prices and quantities between those two sectors.7
6Peneva (2011) provides formal empirical support for the idea that the degree of labor intensity
and the degree of price flexibility are negatively correlated across industries in the U.S.
7The analysis focuses on prices that reflect business-to-business transactions, namely producer
prices (wholesale prices) and prices at the dock of internationally traded goods (border prices).
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1.3.1 Domestic data: new facts
To compute measures of domestic production and prices of nondifferentiated
and differentiated manufacturers, I first map the 2007 version of the Rauch (1999)
categories, originally available at the 4-digit Standard International Trade Classi-
fication (SITC) level, into the NAICS classification of manufacturing industries.
Details on the concordance method are provided in Appendix A.1. In the Rauch
(1999) classification, I treat goods traded on organized exchanges or with reference
prices as nondifferentiated. For illustrative purposes, Appendix Table A.1 reports
an exhaustive list of 4-digit NAICS industries categorized as differentiated, non-
differentiated, or unclassified. Examples of nondifferentiated goods industries are
Dairy Products; Beverages; Fibers, Yarns, and Threads; Basic Chemicals; and Non-
ferrous Metal (Except Aluminum) and Processing. Differentiated goods industries
include Apparel; Pharmaceuticals and Medicines; Industrial Machinery; and Audio
and Video Equipment. In the analysis below, I exclude petroleum industries.
Aggregate production of nondifferentiated and differentiated goods is mea-
sured as the weighted average of (seasonally-adjusted) industrial production indices
corresponding to 4-digit NAICS manufacturing industries classified as nondifferen-
tiated and differentiated, respectively. The weights are calculated using data on the
relative importance weight of each individual industry in the overall Industrial Pro-
duction index. The industry-level data are available since January 1972 and their
source is the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
The aggregate producer prices for nondifferentiated and differentiated goods
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are constructed as weighted averages across the producer price indices (PPIs) for
industries classified as nondifferentiated or differentiated, respectively. Consistent
with the methodology underlying the construction of the overall PPI index, the
weights are based on industry shipment values taken from the 2007 Economic Cen-
sus. The price data are available since January 1976 and are obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). For the PPI analysis, I use data at the 6-digit
NAICS level, as this allows me to maximize the sample period while collecting many
disaggregated price series with a balanced number of observations. All indices are
normalized to 100 in 2007.
Figure 1.1 depicts the percentage (log) changes of the sectoral industrial pro-
duction indices for the period 1972:1 to 2014:6, along with NBER recession bars.
The sectoral indices are smoothed using 9-month moving averages to remove high-
frequency noise. The evidence suggests that while production in both sectors de-
clines during recessions, the quantity produced of differentiated goods falls relatively
more than that of nondifferentiated goods. The first two rows of Table 1.1 show the
total declines in sectoral production during the six recessions in the sample period
and during the acute phase of the last recession. In an average economic downturn,
the decline in production of differentiated goods is roughly twice as large as for
nondifferentiated goods. For instance, the sectoral cumulated changes in produc-
tion during the 2007–2009 recession were −27% (differentiated goods) and −13%
(nondifferentiated goods).
To analyze the behavior of prices in both sectors, I show the percentage changes
of the (smoothed) sectoral PPIs for the period 1976:1–2014:6. As observed in Figure
9
Figure 1.1
Industrial production (IP) index by sector: Percentage (log) changes in smoothed
indices, 1972:1–2014:6
Notes: The graph shows changes in the logs of sectoral IP indices, smoothed using 9-month
centered moving averages, multiplied by 100. The shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates.
Table 1.1
Cumulated changes in industrial production indices and producer price indices
during recessions and selected sub-periods, by sector (%)
1973–75 1980 1981–82 1990–91 2001 2007–09 Aug.08–
Jun.09
Production
Nondiff. -11.5 -5.2 -5.5 -3.2 -1.2 -13.4 -8.2
Diff. -20.1 -10.5 -11.9 -7.7 -4.7 -27.2 -22.4
Prices
Nondiff. n/a 3.1 -5.0 -3.8 -2.7 -1.9 -15.0
Diff. n/a 6.9 4.0 1.8 0.7 6.9 0.8
Notes: The table reports the percentage (log) changes cumulated during NBER recession dates and
the acute phase of the 2007–2009 recession (August 2008 to June 2009). The underlying monthly
data for production corresponds to the sectoral industrial production indices for nondifferentiated
and differentiated goods. The underlying monthly data for prices corresponds to the sectoral pro-
ducer price indices for nondifferentiated and differentiated goods.
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1.2, the relative stability of differentiated goods prices contrasts with the much more
volatile prices of nondifferentiated goods. This is consistent with evidence from mi-
cro data underlying the construction of the U.S. PPI, that raw manufactured goods
tend to exhibit higher price flexibility than other categories of more differentiated
manufacturers (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). The last two rows of Table 1.1
show that prices of nondifferentiated goods declined in four of the last five reces-
sions. In the critical phase of the 2007–2009 recession (2008:8–2009:6), their fall was
particularly severe (−15%). On the other hand, differentiated goods prices either
increased or remained fairly stable in all of the recessions included in the sample
period.8
The empirical results imply an important role for differences in the elasticity
of sectoral supply curves. To clarify this idea, consider the following argument. The
majority of recent recessions are associated with demand shocks, which tend to re-
duce prices and quantities for all sectors. However, differentiated goods are likely to
face larger shifts in demand than nondifferentiated goods. This is because differen-
tiated goods are arguably characterized by higher income elasticity and durability
than nondifferentiated goods. Although by itself a bigger demand shock could ex-
plain the relatively larger quantity drops observed among differentiated goods, it
cannot rationalize the evidence of smaller price declines among these industries. In
8I also found that the heterogeneity in the adjustment of sectoral PPIs holds controlling for
durability of the goods. But in terms of production, at least in 2007–2009, the disproportionate
decline in the quantity produced of differentiated goods was mostly driven by the adjustment in
nondurable goods. Moreover, although my focus in on recessions, I have found evidence of sym-
metric sectoral quantity and price patterns during the following booms: 1978q2–1979q1, 1987q4-
1989q1, and 1998q4-2000q2. In all these episodes, nondifferentiated goods prices increased relative
to those of differentiated goods, and the quantity produced of differentiated goods increased at
least as much as that of nondifferentiated goods.
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Figure 1.2
Producer price index (PPI) by sector: Percentage (log) changes in smoothed
indices, 1976:1–2014:6
Notes: The graph shows changes in the logs of sectoral PPIs, smoothed using 9-month centered
moving averages, multiplied by 100. The shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates. See text
for further details.
fact, a flatter supply curve for differentiated goods than for nondifferentiated goods
appears to be a key element to explain the empirical findings.
1.3.2 International trade data: a brief survey
In their study of micro data on U.S. import and export prices at the dock,
Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) document that differentiated goods display lower fre-
quency of price adjustment than nondifferentiated goods. There is also evidence
that differentiated goods prices of imports and exports were stable during the 2007–
2009 recession, whereas nondifferentiated goods prices strongly declined (see e.g.
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Gopinath et al., 2012). Moreover, in that recession the reduction in trade volumes
of differentiated goods was particularly severe, whereas nondifferentiated goods ex-
hibited relatively smaller quantity decreases (see e.g. Haddad et al., 2010). That
is, the aforementioned patterns for sectoral domestic prices and quantities appear
to be present as well in international trade data.
It is worth noting that the heterogeneity across nondifferentiated and differ-
entiated goods in international trade variables has been documented by papers that
employ different sources of data. Gopinath et al. (2012) use confidential product-
level data on at-the-dock prices from the BLS, Levchenko et al. (2010) employ data
on trade flows and prices for end-use industries, and Haddad et al. (2010) use data
on trade values and unit values at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) level for a
group of countries including the U.S.9
1.3.3 Effects of monetary policy shocks: VAR evidence
So far I have presented evidence of heterogeneous adjustment in prices and
quantities across nondifferentiated and differentiated manufacturers during reces-
sions. The previous results imply that in a typical recession both the relative prices
of nondifferentiated goods to differentiated goods and the relative quantities of dif-
ferentiated goods to nondifferentiated goods decline.
I now investigate whether these patterns of adjustment in relative prices and
quantities hold conditional on a contractionary monetary policy shock. The results
9Gopinath et al. (2012) explicitly identify manufactured goods in their data. They also verify
the robustness of the results to the consideration of different relationship structures between trading
parties (i.e., market-based or related-party transactions), different durability and end-uses of the
goods, and different locations of the trading partners.
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of this exercise provide an empirical benchmark to test the sectoral predictions of
the model described in the next section. As anticipated in the introduction, stan-
dard monetary models with heterogeneity in price stickiness would predict declines
in both the ratio of nondifferentiated-to-differentiated goods prices and the ratio
of differentiated-to-nondifferentiated goods quantities in the wake of a tightening
monetary shock.
I estimate VARs on monthly U.S. data to generate impulse response func-
tions (IRFs) to contractionary monetary policy shocks. The identification method
is based on the standard recursiveness assumption developed in Christiano et al.
(1999)—the central bank observes the current and lagged values of all the variables
in the VAR, and the monetary policy shock affects only the monetary instrument
contemporaneously. I report IRFs to a positive one-standard-deviation innovation
to the federal funds rate. The approximate 90% confidence bands associated with
the IRFs are constructed using 500 Monte Carlo replications.
Domestic data: The VAR for domestic data includes (in Cholesky order) the
relative industrial outputs of differentiated to nondifferentiated goods, the relative
PPIs of nondifferentiated to differentiated goods, the Commodity Research Bureau
commodity price index, and the federal funds rate. Both the output and the price
ratios enter the VAR in logs, while the commodity price index is in log changes, and
the federal funds rate is in levels. The sample period is 1976:1–2012:12 and the lag
order is 9 (which is sufficient to eliminate autocorrelation of the residuals).10
10The commodity price index is introduced to capture supply shocks and to alleviate the problem
of “price puzzles” in the responses of prices. To assess the sensitivity of the results, I estimated
other VARs using different specifications; e.g., introducing money (M2), including more lags, and
using the Wu and Xia (2014) “shadow federal funds rate” that allows the Fed’s policy rate to
14
As shown in Figure 1.3, prices of nondifferentiated goods exhibit a statistically
significant decline relative to prices of differentiated goods within the first year after
the shock (left panel). The peak response is nearly −0.3% and occurs after three to
five months. The relative quantity produced of differentiated to nondifferentiated
goods also falls following a monetary contraction in a statistically significant way
(right panel), and the effect appears to be highly persistent. During the first six first
months after the shock, the maximum reduction in the relative outputs is 0.16%.11
Figure 1.3
Empirical impulse responses to contractionary monetary policy shock: VAR with
domestic data
Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the months after the shock. The variables are measured in
percent. The gray area represents the corresponding 90% probability bands.
go below zero during the recent “zero lower bound” period. The main results in these VARs are
broadly the same as in the baseline estimation.
11I also estimated two additional sectoral VARs, each including sector-specific measures of PPI
and industrial production, and found no evidence of price puzzles, as desired.
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My results in terms of price responses echo those reported by Balke and Wynne
(2007). They study highly disaggregated U.S. producer prices, and find suggestive
evidence that a contractionary monetary shock is more likely to have the standard
short-term negative effect on prices of raw goods than on prices of more processed
goods.
Trade data: To evaluate the responses of relative prices and quantities to
monetary shocks in international trade data, I use disaggregated data on U.S. ex-
ports and imports from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) website,
readily available at the 4-digit NAICS level since 1997. In particular, export and im-
port volume indices for nondifferentiated and differentiated goods are constructed
as weighted averages across 4-digit NAICS manufacturing industries classified as
nondifferentiated and differentiated, respectively.12 The weights are based on total
trade values over the sample period. A similar procedure is followed to construct
sectoral measures of export and import prices at the dock. To proxy for these prices
I use data on unit values published by the USITC. In the appendix I provide further
methodological details on the construction of these variables.
In an initial analysis of the USITC-based sectoral measures of trade prices
and volumes, I find that the import data conform with the evidence surveyed in
section 1.3.2. In particular, during the 2001 and 2007–2009 recessions, both the
relative import prices of nondifferentiated goods to differentiated goods and the
relative import volumes of differentiated goods to nondifferentiated goods decline.
12Outliers are excluded by eliminating changes of a magnitude greater than 2 log points in the
disaggregated trade volume series.
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However, the relative export prices of nondifferentiated goods to differentiated goods
slightly increase in the 2007–2009 recession. This anomaly might indicate problems
associated with the use of unit values as proxies for export prices or with the use
of data at the industry-level (e.g., the impossibility of isolating price changes from
shifts in quality, or composition changes within each industry). In light of this
finding, I conduct the VAR analysis only for data on imports.
To conserve degrees of freedom, I estimate two separate VARs: one for relative
import prices, and the other for relative import volumes. For the same reason, the
VARs exclude two potentially important variables in an open economy, namely the
foreign interest rate and the exchange rate.13 However, adding either of these vari-
ables or estimating a single VAR with the relative prices and the relative quantities
does not change the main results. The variables in Cholesky order are domestic
manufacturing production, a domestic price index, foreign (average of non-U.S., G-
6 countries) industrial production, a commodity price index, the relative import
volumes of differentiated to nondifferentiated goods or the relative import prices of
nondifferentiated to differentiated goods, and the federal funds rate. The relative
prices and volumes enter in logs, and the federal funds rate is in levels. All other
variables enter in log changes. The sample period is 1997:1–2012:12 and the lag
order is 9.14
In Figure 1.4, the left panel shows that the import prices of nondifferentiated
13See Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Kim (2001) for related VAR specifications of open-
economy monetary models in the spirit of Christiano et al. (1999).
14The source for the foreign variables is the International Financial Statistics dataset. The
results are robust to several model modifications, such as introducing money (M2) and changing
the order of the variables.
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goods relative to prices of differentiated goods tend to decline following the mon-
etary policy shock. The maximum statistically significant response of the relative
price is a decline of 1% after six months. The response of the import volumes of
differentiated goods relative to that of nondifferentiated goods (right panel) is im-
precisely estimated, as implied by the wide confidence bounds. However, around the
horizon when the relative import price is most responsive to the monetary policy
shock (i.e., between the fourth and the sixth month after the shock), the relative
import quantities decline too, showing a peak reduction of 0.4%.
Figure 1.4
Empirical impulse responses to contractionary monetary policy shock: VAR with
import data
Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the months after the shock. The variables are measured in
percent. The gray area represents the corresponding 90% probability bands.
To summarize, the VAR evidence for domestic and trade data suggests that
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the movements in the relative prices and relative quantities conditional on a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock are consistent with the patterns of adjustment
across sectors observed during a typical recession. That is, the relative prices of
nondifferentiated goods to differentiated goods and the relative quantities of differ-
entiated goods to nondifferentiated goods tend to decline in the short run following
a monetary contraction.
1.4 Model
This section presents a two-country multi-sector general equilibrium model
with heterogeneity in price stickiness. The model features two tradable manufactur-
ing sectors, which produce nondifferentiated (N) and differentiated (D) goods. The
description of the model mostly focuses on the Home country (H). Unless otherwise
stated, analogous equations hold for the Foreign country (F ).
In each country, infinitely-lived households consume a CES aggregate over
tradable and nontradable goods, supply labor to producing firms, and invest in a
complete set of freely-traded state-contingent financial assets, which without loss of
generality are denominated in the Home currency. An explicit reference to the states
of nature is omitted to simplify the notation. Labor is immobile across countries and
mobile across sectors. To close the model, nominal aggregate spending is assumed
to follow an exogenous autoregressive process.
Households. The representative household in the Home country maximizes
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expected lifetime utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C
1−γ
H,t
1− γ
−
L1+φH,t
1 + φ
]
,
where CH,t is an overall consumption index, LH,t denotes labor supply, E0 is the time-
0 expectations operator, β is the discount factor, γ is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and φ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The consumption aggregators have a CES structure. Final consumption CH,t
is an aggregator of tradable and nontradable goods, denoted by CH,t and C
z
H,t,
respectively:
CH,t =
[
χ1/ω (CH,t)
(ω−1)/ω + (1− χ)1/ω
(
CzH,t
)(ω−1)/ω]ω/(ω−1)
,
where ω ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable
goods, and χ ∈ [0, 1] is the steady-state share of tradable goods in final consumption.
The consumption of nontradable goods CzH,t is given by an aggregator of varieties
i ∈ [0, 1] with elasticity of substitution ξ > 1: CzH,t =
(∫ 1
0
CzH,t(i)
(ξ−1)/ξdi
)ξ/(ξ−1)
.
The consumption of tradable goods CH,t is an aggregator of nondifferentiated and
differentiated goods (denoted by CHN,t and CHD,t, respectively) with elasticity of
substitution η ≥ 0:
CH,t =
[
µ
1/η
N C
(η−1)/η
HN,t + µ
1/η
D C
(η−1)/η
HD,t
]η/(η−1)
,
where µN = 1 − µD ∈ [0, 1] controls the expenditure share of nondifferentiated
goods. The tradable good from sector s consumed in Home is given by a composite
of varieties i ∈ [0, 1] produced by firms in that sector both in the Home and Foreign
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countries, as follows:
CHs,t =
[
ψ1/σss C
(σs−1)/σs
HHs,t + (1− ψs)
1/σs C
(σs−1)/σs
FHs,t
]σs/(σs−1)
,
CkHs,t =
(∫ 1
0
CkHs,t(i)
(σs−1)/σsdi
)σs/(σs−1)
,
where s ∈ {N,D}, k ∈ {H,F}, and the parameter ψs ∈ [1/2, 1] introduces home
bias. The sector-specific elasticity of substitution σs > 1 is assumed to be the
same across the domestic and imported sectoral composites (CHHs,t and CFHs,t),
and across the varieties produced in a given country k (CkHs,t(i)). A reasonable
assumption is that σN > σD. That is, it is easier to substitute nondifferentiated
goods than differentiated goods both across varieties i and across countries of supply
k.15 Note that the notation for CHHs,t and CFHs,t is such that the first subscript
denotes the country where the goods are produced, the second subscript denotes
the country where the goods are sold, and the third subscript denotes the sector.
Consumer optimization yields the following set of demands:
CH,t = χ
(
PH,t
PH,t
)−ω
CH,t, C
z
H,t = (1− χ)
(
P zH,t
PH,t
)−ω
CH,t,
CHs,t = µs
(
PHs,t
PH,t
)−η
CH,t, CHHs,t = ψs
(
PHHs,t
PHs,t
)−σs
CHs,t,
CFHs,t = (1− ψs)
(
PFHs,t
PHs,t
)−σs
CHs,t, CkHs,t(i) =
(
PkHs,t(i)
PkHs,t
)−σs
CkHs,t,
CzH,t(i) =
(
P zH,t(i)
P zH,t
)−ξ
CzH,t,
where PH,t is the overall consumption price index, PH,t is the price index of tradable
15As I discuss below in the calibration of the model, there is empirical evidence in line with the
assumption σN > σD. Using the same elasticity of substitution at the sector level for two levels
of disaggregation of consumption (i.e., across countries of origin and across domestic varieties)
simplifies the calibration.
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goods, P zH,t is the price index of nontradable goods, PHs,t is the price index of
tradable goods from sector s, PkHs,t is the price index of tradable goods from sector
s sold in the Home country and produced in country k, PkHs,t(i) is the price of
variety i from tradable sector s sold in the Home country and produced in country
k, and P zH,t(i) is the price of variety i of nontradable goods. The CES price indices
are given by:
PH,t =
[
χ (PH,t)
1−ω + (1− χ)
(
P zH,t
)1−ω]1/(1−ω)
, P zH,t =
(∫ 1
0
P zH,t(i)
1−ξdi
)1/(1−ξ)
,
PH,t =
[
µNP
1−η
HN,t + µDP
1−η
HD,t
]1/(1−η)
, PHs,t =
[
ψsP
1−σs
HHs,t + (1− ψs)P
1−σs
FHs,t
]1/(1−σs)
,
PkHs,t =
(∫ 1
0
PkHs,t(i)
1−σsdi
)1/(1−σs)
.
The household’s flow budget constraint is:
PH,tCH,t + EtΘt,t+1BH,t+1 ≤ WH,tLH,t +BH,t + ΠH,t,
where BH,t+1 is the state-contingent value of the portfolio held at the beginning of
period t+ 1 (optimally chosen for each possible state of nature), ΠH,t is the sum of
profits from Home tradable and nontradable firms, and WH,t is the nominal wage.
The nominal stochastic discount factor Θt,t+1 that prices the financial asset portfolio
in period t is the same for both countries given an assumption of no arbitrage
opportunities.
Utility maximization subject to the flow budget constraint and to a standard
solvency constraint yields a consumption-labor supply optimality condition:
C
γ
H,tL
φ
H,t =
WH,t
PH,t
,
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and an international risk-sharing condition:
EHF,tP F,t
PH,t
=
(
CH,t
CF,t
)γ
,
where EHF,t is the bilateral nominal exchange rate (price of a unit of Foreign cur-
rency in terms of units of Home currency), and CF,t and P F,t are the Foreign-country
counterparts of the Home overall consumption and price indices, respectively. The
risk-sharing condition results from combining the intertemporal first-order condi-
tions for asset holdings in both countries, assuming symmetric initial conditions.
Distribution and retail sectors.16 Firms in the distribution sector are
perfectly competitive. They combine varieties of distribution services DzH,t(i) sup-
plied by firms in the nontradable sector to produce a CES composite defined by
DzH,t =
(∫ 1
0
DzH,t(i)
(ξ−1)/ξdi
)ξ/(ξ−1)
. For simplicity, no distinction is made between
nontradable consumption goods and distribution services. Hence, the price of the
composite DzH,t is given by the price index of nontradable goods P
z
H,t, and the op-
timal demand from the distribution sector for a variety of nontradables is given by
DzH,t(i) =
(
P zH,t(i)
P zH,t
)−ξ
DzH,t.
Firms in the retail sector are also perfectly competitive and their prices are
flexible. They combine varieties either of nondifferentiated or differentiated goods
with distribution services, in fixed proportions, before selling them to final con-
sumers. Thus, the retail price in the Home country for a sector-s variety i produced
16The specification of these sectors is based on the original contribution of Corsetti and Dedola
(2005). Burstein and Gopinath (2014) discuss several models in the international macro literature
that produce endogenous variable markups.
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domestically is given by:
PHHs,t(i) = P
P
HHs,t(i) + κsP
z
H,t, (1.1)
where P PHHs,t(i) denotes the corresponding producer price in units of the Home
currency, κs > 0 denotes the required number of units of distribution services to
bring sector-s goods to Home consumers (or alternatively, the fixed distribution cost
per sector-s good), and P zH,t is the unit price of such distribution services.
17
I assume an asymmetric pricing structure for cross-border transactions. Pro-
ducers in the Home country set prices for export in units of the Home currency,
while producers in the Foreign country set prices for export also in units of the
Home currency. Therefore, the retail price in the Foreign country for a sector-s
variety i produced in the Home country is:
PHFs,t(i) =
P PHFs,t(i)
EHF,t
+ κsP
z
F,t, (1.2)
where P PHFs,t(i) denotes the producer price set by a Home firm i in units of the Home
currency, and P zF,t is the unit price of distribution services in the Foreign country.
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The retail price in the Home country for a sector-s variety i produced in the Foreign
country is:
PFHs,t(i) = P
P
FHs,t(i) + κsP
z
H,t,
where P PFHs,t(i) denotes the producer price set by a Foreign firm i in units of the
17Note that an elasticity of substitution between tradable goods and distribution services below
one is assumed in the constant returns to scale retail technology. Also, the sectoral fixed proportion
of distribution costs in the retail price, κs, is assumed to be constant across countries.
18As shown below, due to the local distribution costs, PPHHs,t(i) is different from P
P
HFs,t(i). In
other words, a given producer discriminates between markets.
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Home currency.
Tradable sectors. Firms in the tradable sectors produce nondifferentiated
and differentiated goods using linear technologies with labor as the only input:
YHs,t(i) = AHs,tLHs,t(i), where AHs,t denotes productivity in sector s. (In the nu-
merical exercises below, productivity shocks are ignored, that is, Aks,t is set to 1.)
Prices in the tradable sectors are sticky as a result of two mechanisms. First,
I assume nominal price rigidities of the Calvo (1983) type. Second, the retail tech-
nology described above gives rise to endogenous variable markups at the producer
level.
As mentioned above, I adopt a hybrid specification of price setting, by which
both Foreign and Home firms set their export prices in the Home currency. That
is, Foreign firms follow “local currency pricing”(LCP) and Home firms engage in
“producer currency pricing”(PCP) when selling abroad (see e.g. Devereux et al.,
2007). Following Corsetti and Pesenti (2009), I label this specification as “dollar
pricing”. This modelling choice is consistent with our analysis of the model as a
two-country world economy with the U.S. and the rest of the world, as well as with
evidence that for the U.S. there is PCP in exports and LCP in imports (Gopinath
and Rigobon, 2008).
To analyze the variable markup channel, I first ignore Calvo pricing and assume
that producer prices are flexible. The problem of a sector-s firm i from country H
selling to country k is:
max
PPHks,t(i)
(
P PHks,t(i)−
WH,t
AHs,t
)(
PHks,t(i)
PHks,t
)−σS
CHks,t.
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Note that this maximization problem is subject to the relationship between producer
and consumer prices shown in equations (1.1) and (1.2). By symmetry, the optimal
sectoral producer price under flexible prices, denoted by P̃ PHks,t, is common to all
firms i in a given sector s, and can be written as an optimal markup over the
marginal cost:
P̃ PHks,t =

ζHHs,t
WH,t
AHs,t
, if k = H
ζHFs,t
WH,t
AHs,t
, if k = F
,
where ζHHs,t and ζHFs,t are the sector- and destination country-specific optimal
markups, given by:
ζHHs,t ≡
σs
σs − 1
[
1 +
1
σs
AHs,t
WH,t
κsP
z
H,t
]
, ζHFs,t ≡
σs
σs − 1
[
1 +
1
σs
AHs,t
WH,t
κsEHF,tP
z
F,t
]
.
The familiar result that a higher elasticity of substitution σs reduces the sectoral
markup holds. More interestingly, the optimal markups are decreasing in the
marginal cost of the origin country and increasing in the distribution cost of the
destination country.19 The intuition behind these results is clarified by analyzing
the producer’s price elasticity of demand, which in the case of sales abroad, for
example, is given by:
εHFs(i) ≡ −
∂ logCHFs,t(i)
∂ log
(
PPHFs,t(i)
EHF,t
) = σs (1− xHFs,t(i)) ,
where xHFs,t(i) ≡
κsP zF,t
(PPHFs,t(i)/EHF,t)+κsP zF,t
is the sectoral share of the distribution cost
19Analogous maximization problems for the Foreign firm yield the following expressions for
the optimal producer prices in units of the producer’s currency: P̃PFFs,t = ζFFs,t
WF,t
AFs,t
, and
P̃PFHs,t
EHF,t
= ζFHs,t
WF,t
AFs,t
, where the optimal markups ζFFs,t and ζFHs,t are given by: ζFFs,t ≡
σs
σs−1
[
1 + 1σs
AFs,t
WF,t
κsP
z
F,t
]
, and ζFHs,t ≡ σsσs−1
[
1 + 1σs
AFs,t
WF,t
κs
P zH,t
EHF,t
]
.
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in the retail price PHFs,t(i)—or alternatively, the sectoral “distribution margin” for
final consumption of exported goods sold in the Foreign country. A higher producer
price relative to the local distribution cost (measured in the local currency) reduces
the distribution margin, which in turn increases the price elasticity of demand.
Since the monopolistic competitor’s optimal markup is negatively related to the
elasticity of demand (i.e., ζHFs,t =
εHFs(i)
εHFs(i)−1
), a negative relationship between the
markup and the producer’s price relative to the distribution cost is therefore likely
to emerge. The sector-specific absolute elasticity of the markup ζHFs,t with respect
to the relative price
PPHFs,t(i)
EHF,tP
z
F,t
is:
ΓHFs,t(i) ≡ −
∂ log ζHFs,t
∂ log
(
PPHFs,t(i)
EHF,tP
z
F,t
) = [(σs − 1) 1− xHFs,t(i)
xHFs,t(i)
− 1
]−1
. (1.3)
The elasticity of the markup ΓHFs,t(i) is greater (in absolute value) in a sector
s characterized by relatively high distribution margin xHFs,t(i) and low elasticity
of substitution σs. More specifically, equation (1.3) implies that ΓHFs,t(i) = 0 if
xHFs,t(i) = 0. Below I show that for realistic values of xHFs,t(i) and σs, the case in
which xHFs,t(i) > 0 implies ΓHFs,t(i) > 0. Since the optimal producer prices are the
same for all firms i in a given sector s, I hereafter drop the firm index i to refer to
the (equilibrium) sector-specific distribution margin (xHFs,t), the price elasticity of
demand (εHFs), and the elasticity of the markup (ΓHFs,t).
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I now reintroduce the assumption that nominal prices are rigid in the currency
of the producer/exporter according to Calvo pricing. That is, in each period a firm
20The producer’s elasticity of the markup for domestic sales is given by ΓHHs,t =[
(σs − 1) 1−xHHs,txHHs,t − 1
]−1
, where xHHs,t ≡
κsP
z
H,t
PPHHs,t(i)+κsP
z
H,t
is the sectoral distribution margin
for final consumption of domestically produced goods sold in the Home country.
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from sector s adjusts prices with constant probability 1 − θs. For a zero-inflation
steady state, the log-linear optimal sectoral reset price for sales of a Home firm in
country k is given by:
p̂PHks,t = (1− βθs)
∞∑
j=0
(βθs)
j Etp̃
P
Hks,t+j, (1.4)
where lower-case letters denote log-deviations from the steady state, so p̃PHks,t de-
notes the optimal log-linear price for sales of a Home firm in country k if prices
were flexible. Our previous results under flexible prices imply the following pricing
equation for p̃PHks,t:
p̃PHks,t+j =

1
1+ΓHHs
(wH,t+j − aHs,t+j) + ΓHHs1+ΓHHsp
z
H,t+j , if k = H
1
1+ΓHFs
(wH,t+j − aHs,t+j) + ΓHFs1+ΓHFs
(
pzF,t+j + eHF,t+j
)
, if k = F
.
(1.5)
For either k = H or k = F , the first terms in (1.5) indicate that with vari-
able markups (ΓHks > 0), movements in the marginal cost are incompletely passed
through into p̃PHks,t. The pass-through rate is given by
1
1+ΓHks
, which declines with
the steady-state sectoral elasticity of the markup ΓHks. Equations (1.4) and (1.5)
thus imply that, in the face of changes in marginal costs, variable markups ex-
tend non-adjustments in producer prices beyond the period implied by the nominal
rigidity mechanism, and increasingly so for a higher markup elasticity.
The second terms in (1.5) reflect the dependence of optimal markups on local
distribution costs, which are determined by the price of nontradables in the desti-
nation country pzk,t. For the price p̃
P
HFs,t set for sales in country F (denominated in
28
the Home currency), distribution costs are also affected by the nominal exchange
rate eHF,t. An appreciation of the Home currency (i.e., a decline in eHF,t) reduces
distribution costs, which lowers the optimal markup and hence the desired price.
Movements in local distribution costs are passed through into the optimal producer
prices with a coefficient ΓHks
1+ΓHks
, which increases with the sensitivity of the markup
ΓHks.
Analogous expressions can be derived for the Foreign firm. In this case, how-
ever, the optimal price under flexible prices set for sales in country H (p̃PFHs,t+j) is
denominated in units of the Home currency due to the LCP assumption for Home
imports. This price is given by:
p̃PFHs,t+j =
1
1 + ΓFHs
(wF,t+j + eHF,t+j − aFs,t+j) +
ΓFHs
1 + ΓFHs
pzH,t+j, (1.6)
where the presence of the exchange rate eHF,t+j in the first term of equation (1.6) im-
plies that an appreciation of the Home currency causes a reduction in the marginal
cost expressed in units of the Home currency, and hence in the optimal price. As im-
plied by the coefficient 1
1+ΓFHs
, this exchange rate pass-through effect into p̃PFHs,t+j
is incomplete, and the degree of incompleteness is larger for a sector with higher
markup elasticity ΓFHs. Meanwhile, changes in the distribution cost of the destina-
tion country, given by pzH,t+j, are passed through with a coefficient
ΓFHs
1+ΓFHs
.
Overall, the variable markup channel implies that a higher elasticity of the
markup reduces the response of prices to movements in the marginal cost, but
increases their response to changes in the distribution costs.
Nontradable sector. Firms in the nontradable sector produce using lin-
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ear technologies in labor, Y zH,t(i) = L
z
H,t(i), and face Calvo price rigidities with
probability of non-adjustment denoted by θz. Markups in this sector are constant
since distribution services are assumed to be unnecessary for nontradable goods (see
Goldberg and Campa, 2010 for supporting evidence). The log-linear price-setting
condition for all firms i in the nontradable sector is given by:
p̂zH,t = (1− βθz)
∞∑
j=0
(βθz)j Etp̃
z
H,t+j,
where the optimal price in the absence of nominal rigidity is p̃zH,t+j = wH,t+j.
Exogenous nominal spending. To close the model I assume that nominal
spending (or equivalently, nominal aggregate consumption) is driven by an exoge-
nous money supply rule: PH,tCH,t = MH,t, where logMH,t follows an autoregressive
process with shock εMH,t ∼ N(0, σMH). Other papers make a similar assumption
(see e.g. Chari et al., 2000).
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is an allocation and set of prices for all states
of nature and periods, such that households and firms optimize, and assets, goods,
and labor markets clear in both the Home and the Foreign country. The market
clearing conditions are relegated to Appendix A.2. The equilibrium is symmetric
within each country, but asymmetric across countries due to the asymmetric pricing
structure.
Additional definitions. I now define price indices at the industry level for
the Home country that will be analyzed in our quantitative exercise. The sectoral
export price index, EPIHs, captures the prices for sector-s goods exported by the
Home country, measured in the Home currency. The individual firms’ export prices
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at the dock measured in the producer’s currency are equivalent to P PHFs,t(i). Under
the assumptions of symmetric firms and time-dependent pricing, EPIHs,t is then
given by:
EPIHs,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
P PHFs,t(i)
1−σsdi
)1/(1−σs)
.
=
[
θs (EPIHs,t−1)
1−σs + (1− θs)
(
P̂ PHFs,t
)1−σs]1/(1−σs)
, (1.7)
where P̂ PHFs,t denotes the level of the optimal reset export price chosen by a Home
firm.
Analogously, the sectoral import price index, IPIHs, captures the industry-
level prices for sector-s goods produced in the Foreign country and sold in Home,
measured in the Home currency:
IPIHs,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
P PFHs,t(i)
1−σsdi
)1/(1−σs)
=
[
θs (IPIHs,t−1)
1−σs + (1− θs)
(
P̂ PFHs,t
)1−σs]1/(1−σs)
, (1.8)
where P̂ PFHs,t denotes the level of the optimal reset export price chosen by a Foreign
firm. As observed in equations (1.7) and (1.8), neither the export price indices nor
the import price indices for the Home country are directly affected by movements
in the exchange rate. This is because, following our dollar-pricing assumption, the
optimal firm-level export and import prices for the Home country are originally
invoiced in the Home currency.
Finally, the definition of the sectoral producer price index, PPIHs, takes into
account that PPIs in the U.S. data include changes in prices for exported goods.
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Thus I define:
PPIHs,t = (DPIHs,t)
ψs (EPIHs,t)
1−ψs , (1.9)
where ψs is the domestic share of spending in sector s and DPIHs,t is the domestic
component of the sectoral producer price index (or simply, the sectoral domestic
price index ), defined as:
DPIHs,t =
[
θs (DPIHs,t−1)
1−σs + (1− θs)
(
P̂ PHHs,t
)1−σs]1/(1−σs)
,
where P̂ PHHs,t is the level of the optimal reset price for domestic sales set by a Home
firm.
1.5 Quantitative results
This section first describes the benchmark calibration. I then show the impulse
responses of sectoral prices and quantities to an adverse nominal spending shock.
Next, I analyze the relevance of the sector-specific nominal rigidities and variable
markups in explaining the results. Lastly, I compare the theoretical impulse re-
sponses of relative prices and quantities across sectors with the empirical impulse
responses shown in section 1.3.3.
1.5.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to monthly data. Table 1.2 shows the benchmark
calibration. Some of the parameters are set to values that are standard in the
literature. To match an annual discount rate of 4%, I set the discount factor β =
32
0.961/12. The risk aversion parameter and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply take values of γ = 1 and φ = 0.4, respectively. I calibrate the weight
of nontradable goods in total consumption χ = 0.53 to match the share observed
in U.S. data, following the calculations in Corsetti et al. (2008). The elasticity of
substitution between tradables and nontradables ω is set to 0.74, as estimated in
Mendoza (1991) based on data from industrialized countries.
Table 1.2
Benchmark calibration
Parameter Value Description/Source/Target
β 0.997 Discount factor.
γ 1 CRRA.
φ 0.40 Inverse Frisch elasticity.
χ 0.53 Share of tradable goods in consumption. Source: Corsetti et al.
(2008).
ω 0.74 Elast. of subst. between tradables and nontradables. Source: Men-
doza (1991).
η 1.50 Elast. of subst. between diff. and nondiff. goods.
µD 0.54 Share of diff. goods in tradable consumption. Source: NIPAs.
ψD 0.81 Domestic share in diff. goods consumption. Source: NIPAs and
McCulley (2011).
ψN 0.92 Domestic share in nondiff. goods consumption. Source: NIPAs and
McCulley (2011).
σD 2.3 Elast. of subst. across diff. varieties. Source: Broda and Weinstein
(2006).
σN 3.2 Elast. of subst. across nondiff. varieties. Source: Broda and Wein-
stein (2006).
κD 5.67 Units of distrib. services in retail diff. goods. Calibration target:
aggregate distrib. margin in final consumption, diff. goods (xD =
0.49; source: 2007 input-output tables).
κN 1.32 Units of distrib. services in retail nondiff. goods. Calibration target:
aggregate distrib. margin in final consumption, nondiff. goods (xN =
0.42; source: 2007 input-output tables).
θD 0.93 Frequency of price non-adjustment, diff. goods. Source: Gopinath
and Rigobon (2008) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
θN 0.60 Frequency of price non-adjustment, nondiff. goods. Source:
Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
θz 0.94 Frequency of price non-adjustment, nontradable goods. Source:
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
ρMH , ρMF 0.97 Persistence monetary shock. Source: M2 data.
σMH , σMF 0.003 Std. dev. monetary shock. Source: M2 data.
ρMH,MF 0.5 Cross-country correlation between monetary shocks.
Note: See section 1.5.1 for further details.
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For both countries, the persistence of the money supply shock is set to ρM =
0.97, and the standard deviation to σM = 0.33%. These values are estimated by
fitting an AR(1) process to seasonally adjusted, HP filtered (log) M2 supply data for
the U.S over the sample period 1970:1–2014:6. I assume that the shocks are partially
and positively correlated across countries (ρMH,MF = 0.5). This assumption is
supported by the evidence of monetary policy synchronization between the U.S.
and other advanced economies (see e.g. Scotti, 2011 and Arouri et al., 2013). I
checked that using alternative moderate values for ρMH,MF does not change the
main results.
A second set of parameters are chosen to match evidence from the interna-
tional trade literature that uses the Rauch (1999) classification. I use elasticities of
substitution σN = 3.2 and σD = 2.3, which correspond to averages of the median
sectoral elasticity estimates for the 1972–1988 and 1990–2001 periods documented
in Broda and Weinstein (2006). The value of σN relies upon Broda and Weinstein’s
estimates for goods with reference prices.
Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) calculate the monthly frequency of price adjust-
ment using micro data on U.S. export and import prices at the dock for the period
1994–2005. Since they break down their results by Rauch (1999) categories, I use
an average of their median sectoral estimates for export and import prices to set
θN = 0.60 and θD = 0.93. These values imply median price durations of 2.5 and
14.3 months, respectively.21
21Since Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) report the number of goods in each Rauch category, I
construct a weighted average of their median estimates for organized exchanges and reference
priced goods to calculate θN .
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If the sectoral frequencies of price adjustment were instead measured using
data for producer prices, the results would be very similar. Using disaggregated data
underlying the U.S. PPI for 1994–2005, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) compute the
frequency of price changes by two-digit major groups (see Table VI in their paper).
These groups map reasonably well into 3-digit NAICS industries, which allows me to
classify them as nondifferentiated or differentiated goods.22 The median frequencies
of producer price persistence across the groups classified as nondifferentiated and
differentiated are 0.63 and 0.96, respectively.
To set the values of a third group of parameters, I rely on new calculations
based on several sources of U.S. data, such as disaggregated trade data, input-
output (I-O) accounts, the national income and product accounts (NIPAs), and
industry concordances from the U.S. Census and the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). Methodological details are provided in Appendix A.1. Using annual data
from the NIPAs for Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) by type of product
and my own classification of PCE categories of nondurable consumption goods as
nondifferentiated and differentiated, I measure the real expenditure share in these
two types of goods (µN and µD, respectively). For the period 1999–2012, the average
expenditure shares are µN = 0.46 and µD = 0.54. As is standard in the literature
(see e.g. Stockman and Tesar, 1995), an implicit assumption is that all goods in the
PCE basket for nondurable goods, as opposed to services, are tradable. The use of
22The following PPI major groups are considered as nondifferentiated: ‘Farm products’, ‘Pro-
cessed foods and feeds’, ‘Fuels and related products and power’, and ‘Pulp, paper, and allied
products’. The remaining major groups listed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) are labeled
as differentiated, with the exception of ‘Chemicals and allied products’ and ‘Metals and metal
products’, which are left unclassified.
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data on nondurable consumption goods is consistent with the nature of the goods
in the model.
Relying on the same classification for PCE categories, I pin down the domestic
shares in sectoral consumption ψs and the steady-state distribution margin for final
consumption at the sector level, which is denoted by xs. (In the steady state, distri-
bution margins for final consumption of domestic and imported goods are equalized
within sectors: xs ≡ xHHs = xHFs = xFFs = xFHs.) Since imports by PCE cate-
gories are not published in the NIPAs, I use the import share estimates of McCulley
(2011) for the latest year in his analysis, namely 2009. Based on this evidence, I
calculate values for ψN and ψD of 0.92 and 0.81, respectively.
23
To compute the sectoral distribution margins (xs =
κsP z
Ps
) I use the BEA’s
bridge tables that map PCE categories into the final use categories in the I-O ac-
counts at the most disaggregated level. Following Goldberg and Campa (2010), the
distribution margin for sector s is then calculated as the sum of (wholesale and re-
tail) distribution margins and transportation costs, divided by the sum of all output
valued at purchaser’s prices, across all final use categories in the I-O accounts from
sector s. Using data from 2007, I obtain aggregate sectoral margins of xN = 0.42
and xD = 0.49.
24 These constitute calibration targets, which conditional on the
values for σN and σD specified above imply sectoral inputs of distribution services
23I use McCulley’s (2011) estimates for nondurable consumption goods categories displayed in
Table 1 (shares of PCE by major type of product) and Table 4 (import shares of PCE by major
type of product) of his paper—see footnote 22 in McCulley (2011) for methodological details.
24The baseline values for the distribution margins are robust to the use of other methodologies.
Considering average margins across each sector, I obtain xN = 0.40 and xD = 0.53. As I detail in
Appendix A.1, using more aggregated data from the I-O accounts it is also possible to calculate
aggregate sectoral margins for the period 1997–2012, obtaining annual averages of xN = 0.41 and
xD = 0.49.
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of κN = 1.32 and κD = 5.67.
Figure 1.5 shows the sector-s steady-state elasticity of the markup, denoted by
Γs, as a function of steady-state values for the distribution margins xs. Following
equation (1.3), Γs is given by: Γs =
[
(σs − 1) 1−xsxs − 1
]−1
, which is increasing in
xs and decreasing in the elasticity of substitution σs. As observed, given that our
benchmark calibration considers σN > σD, for any given value of the distribution
margin xs the depicted elasticity of the markup in the nondifferentiated goods sector
is smaller than that in the differentiated goods sector: ΓN < ΓD. Since the evidence
suggests that distribution margins above 60% are rare (Burstein et al., 2003; Gold-
berg and Campa, 2010), the figure indicates that for a plausible calibration, the
model may only predict potentially high values for ΓD but not for ΓN .
As indicated by asterisks in the graph, the baseline values for ΓN and ΓD are
0.48 and 2.88, respectively. These numbers are within the range of values that have
been used in the literature (see Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2011). This parameterization
implies that prices in the differentiated goods sector respond less to movements in
the marginal cost but more to changes in the distribution costs relative to prices in
the nondifferentiated goods sector. It also implies a lower long-run exchange rate
pass-through into import prices of sector D relative to sector N (0.26 and 0.68,
respectively), which is in line with available evidence based upon micro data for the
U.S. (Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2010). These measures of pass-through, calculated as
1− Γs
1+Γs
, eliminate the effect of nominal rigidities.
The calibration of the model is completed as follows. The frequency of price
non-adjustment for nontradable goods θz is set equal to 0.94, based on the median
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Figure 1.5
Sensitivity of elasticities of markups to distribution margins
Notes: The depicted values assume σN = 3.2 and σD = 2.3. The asterisk on each curve indicates
the parameter value implied by the benchmark calibration targets for the distribution margins
xN and xD.
regular price duration for ‘Services (excluding travel)’ reported by Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008) for micro data underlying the U.S. CPI. The elasticity of substitu-
tion between differentiated and nondifferentiated goods in tradable consumption is
set to η = 1.5.
1.5.2 Responses to a monetary shock
To solve the model, I log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around a zero-
inflation steady state and use perturbation methods. I simulate the effect of a
demand-driven recession in both countries. I specifically hit the Home country with
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a negative one-standard-deviation shock to nominal aggregate spending, which is
partially transmitted to the Foreign country because of the assumed cross-country
shock correlation. The tighter monetary contraction in Home relative to Foreign
causes an endogenous appreciation of the Home currency. An international economic
slowdown accompanied by an appreciation of the U.S. dollar have characterized the
recent recessions of 2001 and 2007–09.25 The recession scenario for both countries
is detailed in Figure 1.6, which depicts impulse responses of aggregate variables.
Figure 1.6
Theoretical impulse responses to contractionary nominal spending shock:
aggregate variables
Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the months after the shock. The variables are measured in
percent.
25Mussa (1986) is a classic reference for evidence that fluctuations in nominal and real exchange
rates are driven by monetary shocks. For more recent evidence, see e.g. Bouakez and Normandin
(2010). Using a VAR analysis, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) find empirically that contractionary
shocks to U.S. monetary policy lead to persistent and significant appreciations in U.S. nominal
and real exchange rates.
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With sticky prices, the negative shock to nominal spending implies a reduc-
tion in overall real consumption. This leads to a decline in the demand for labor,
which explains the decline in real and nominal wages. Therefore, marginal costs
and distribution costs (not shown) fall. Since the shock originates in Home and is
only partially transmitted to the Foreign economy, the magnitude of these effects is
greater in the Home country. The appreciation of the Home currency is apparent in
the decline of the nominal exchange rate.
Figure 1.7 displays the responses of sectoral PPIs and outputs in the Home
country. Given that the U.S. is a relatively closed economy, the PPIs (which embody
a component of export price changes, as observed in equation (1.9)) mostly reflect
movements in prices set for local sales. Prices decrease due to the generalized decline
in marginal costs and distribution costs, but while the PPI of nondifferentiated goods
shows a sizeable decline, the PPI of differentiated goods exhibits a relatively small
reduction (see left panel). Given our calibration, this result is explained at least in
part by the fact that nominal rigidities are more stringent for differentiated goods
producers (θN < θD). Below I scrutinize the role of the variable markup channel.
Production in both sectors falls on impact as a consequence of the negative
income effect caused by the shock, but the decline in differentiated goods output
is larger and more protracted than that of nondifferentiated goods (right panel
in Figure 1.7). This heterogeneity in the output responses across sectors arises
because the price ratio of differentiated goods to nondifferentiated goods increases
after the shock, leading to a substitution effect that biases consumption, and hence
production, towards the latter.
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Figure 1.7
Theoretical impulse responses to contractionary nominal spending shock: sectoral
domestic variables, Home country
Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the months after the shock. The variables are measured in
percent.
The responses of sectoral trade variables for the Home country to a contrac-
tionary monetary shock are depicted in Figure 1.8. Similar to the patterns exhibited
by the domestic variables, the export and import prices (quantities) fall dispropor-
tionately in the nondifferentiated (differentiated) goods sector. The trade price
indices decline as a result of the reductions in local marginal costs and distribution
costs associated with the declines in wages. Moreover, the appreciation of the Home
currency contributes both to the reduction in distribution costs faced by Home ex-
porters and to the decline in production costs (in units of Home currency) faced
by Foreign exporters. Meanwhile, as in the case of domestic production discussed
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above, the observed responses of sectoral trade volumes reflect a negative income
effect as well as a substitution of nondifferentiated goods for differentiated goods in
the wake of the adjustment of the relative trade prices.
Figure 1.8
Theoretical impulse responses to contractionary nominal spending shock: sectoral
trade variables, Home country
Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the months after the shock. The variables are measured in
percent.
In sum, the model predicts that a demand-driven recession in the U.S. features
declines in the relative prices of nondifferentiated goods to differentiated goods and
in the relative quantities of differentiated goods to nondifferentiated goods. These
results suggest that price-setting frictions are indeed relevant to explain the patterns
observed in the data.
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1.5.3 The key mechanisms: nominal rigidities and variable markups
To examine the quantitative role of the key mechanisms of the model, Table
1.3 displays the cumulated impulse responses of several price measures to a contrac-
tionary monetary shock for three alternative model specifications. The responses
are accumulated over a 36-month horizon, but the results are not affected if I use a
different horizon.
In addition to the baseline model that assumes the benchmark calibration, I
consider a model with “constant markups”, in which the variable markup channel is
shut down by assuming calibration targets for the distribution margins very close to
zero (xN = xD ≈ 0), so that markup elasticities are zero as well (ΓN = ΓN = 0). I
also compute a model with a uniform degree of nominal rigidity, in which the same
frequency of price adjustment is used for both sectors (dubbed as “Same Calvo pa-
rameters” in the Table). This model assumes θN = θD = 0.93, the value for the
Calvo parameter in the differentiated goods sector employed in the benchmark cali-
bration. For each of these models, Table 1.3 shows the cumulated sectoral responses
of firm-level prices—optimal producer prices under flexible prices and optimal reset
prices—and industry-level price indices corresponding to domestic and international
transactions. The columns labeled as ‘Gap N −D’ report the cumulated responses
of the relative prices of nondifferentiated goods to differentiated goods.
A first result that stands out is that the model with constant markups con-
sistently shows larger sectoral price declines than the baseline model, which is in
line with the intuition that, by offsetting the effects of movements in marginal costs,
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variable markups generate price stickiness above and beyond the nominal rigidity
channel. Table 1.3 also reveals that with constant markups, the responses of export
prices are the same as those of domestic prices. This is because with PCP in exports,
producers do not “price to market” in the absence of local distribution costs.
Furthermore, focusing on the industry-level price indices (bottom part of the
Table), the relative prices of nondifferentiated goods to differentiated goods exhibit
similar magnitudes of adjustment in the baseline model as in the model with constant
markups. In contrast, the model with a unique Calvo parameter shows only small
changes in these relative prices. For example, the PPI of nondifferentiated goods
relative to that of differentiated goods decreases around 3% both in the baseline
model and in the model with constant markups, but it only declines by 0.6% in
the model with a single Calvo parameter. Importantly, this evidence implies that
the bulk of heterogeneity in the baseline impulse responses of sectoral prices to a
monetary shock is accounted for by the nominal rigidity channel. In other words, a
model with variable markups and homogenous frequencies of price adjustment across
sectors only produces a small degree of heterogeneity in the responses of sectoral
prices and quantities.26
Although the variable markup channel by itself fails to generate significant
movements in the relative prices between sectors at the industry level, this mech-
anism does generate a higher degree of asymmetry in the sectoral price responses
at the firm level—particularly among optimal prices in a flexible-price environment.
26Other papers have also found that the quantitative macro effects of real rigidities in the form
of variable markups are modest. For instance, Gopinath and Itskhoki (2011) use a model with
strategic complementarities in price setting at the producer level, and arrive at this conclusion by
simulating the dynamics of a closed economy model featuring idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
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To illustrate this, observe that in the top part of Table 1.3, the cumulated declines
in the relative optimal prices (under flexible prices) are roughly between 1% and
2% both in the baseline model and in the model with a unique Calvo parameter. In
line with our previous discussion, this result is attributable to the higher elasticity
of the markup in sector D, which makes optimal prices in this sector less sensitive
to the reduction in marginal costs than those in sector N .
But as the results for the model with a single Calvo parameter indicate, the
variable markup channel generates smaller movements in the relative prices between
sectors if we focus instead on the optimal reset prices (middle part of Table 1.3) and
the industry-level price indices (bottom part). This is explained by the interaction of
two mechanisms. First, nominal rigidities have compounding effects, which reduce
the sensitivity of all sectoral prices to changes in the economic environment (e.g., to
the decline in marginal costs).27 Second, a higher elasticity of the markup in sector
D increases the sensitivity of prices in this sector to the reduction in distribution
costs relative to sector N .
To complement the analysis, Figure 1.9 considers the same three alternative
model specifications, and depicts the dynamic responses of relative prices (at the
sectoral level) and relative quantities to an adverse nominal shock. Consistent with
the results in Table 1.3, we see that after the shock, the three models predict that
the relative prices of nondifferentiated goods to differentiated goods (in terms of
the PPIs, export price indices, and import price indices) decrease in the short run.
27The compounding effects of nominal rigidities arise because, as observed in equations (1.4),
(1.7), and (1.8), the optimal reset prices and the industry-level price indices are functions of the
degree of nominal rigidity measured by the Calvo parameter θs.
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Figure 1.9 also shows that all of the models predict declines in the relative quantities
produced and relative trade volumes of differentiated goods to nondifferentiated
goods.
Figure 1.9
Theoretical impulse responses to contractionary nominal spending shock: relative
prices and quantities under alternative models, Home country
Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the months after the shock. The variables are measured in
percent. The model with constant markups sets the distribution margins to a number very close
to zero (xN = xD ≈ 0), so that the elasticities of the markups are zero (ΓN = ΓN = 0). The
model with homogeneous Calvo parameters assumes the same frequency of price adjustment in
both sectors: θN = θD = 0.93. (In the baseline calibration, 0.93 is the value of the Calvo
parameter for sector D.)
It is apparent from Figure 1.9 that a model with variable markups and ho-
mogenous frequencies of price adjustment across sectors (dashed green lines) only
produces a small degree of heterogeneity in the responses of sectoral prices and
quantities. Thus, this graphical evidence confirms that the nominal rigidity channel
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matters quantitatively more than the variable markup channel in explaining the
results of the baseline model. Meanwhile, a model with constant markups (dotted
black lines) slightly magnifies the responses of the relative prices and quantities
as compared to the baseline model (solid blue lines). As mentioned before, this
is due to the compounding effects of the cross-sector nominal rigidities and to the
differences in the sectoral markup elasticities to changes in distribution costs.
1.5.4 Model-based vs. empirical impulse response functions
Finally, I evaluate the model in terms of its ability to fit the VAR evidence. Fig-
ure 1.10 compares the empirical impulse responses of relative prices and quantities
to a tightening monetary shock, as reported in section 1.3.3, with their model-based
counterparts. The latter are calculated from the model’s IRFs corresponding to
sectoral prices (PPIs and import price indices) and quantities (outputs and import
volumes).
As observed, in the first few months after the shock, the theoretical IRFs are
either within or very close to the 90% confidence regions estimated in the VARs, so
the match in terms of magnitude is reasonably good. Naturally, though, the model
cannot replicate some of the delayed and hump-shaped empirical IRFs, as we ignore
mechanisms which have proved useful in improving the empirical fit of monetary
models (such as habit formation, capital accumulation and adjustment costs).
To study the quantitative effects of a monetary shock in more detail, I compute
three summary measures for the empirical and theoretical impulse responses: the
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Figure 1.10
Theoretical and empirical impulse responses to contractionary nominal spending
shock: relative prices and quantities, Home country
Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the months after the shock. The variables are measured in
percent. The empirical IRFs (solid lines) and their 90% probability bands (grey areas) are the
same as in Figures 1.3 and 1.4. Following the notation of the model, the theoretical IRFs (dashed
lines) are calculated as: ppiHN − ppiHD (relative producer prices), yHD− yHN (relative quantities
produced), ipiHN − ipiHD (relative import prices), and cFHD − cFHN (relative import volumes).
maximum monthly response with expected sign observed within the first year after
the shock, the average response in the first 12 months after the shock, and the
response recorded 6 months after the shock. Table 1.4 displays the results. Again,
I report model-based IRFs using three versions of the model: the baseline model,
a model with constant markups, and a model with the same frequency of price
adjustment across sectors. Importantly, the main conclusions from this comparative
analysis are robust to the use of other values for the Calvo parameters and the
distribution-margin targets (see additional experiments in Appendix A.3).
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Table 1.4
Summary measures of theoretical and empirical impulse
responses to contractionary nominal spending shock: relative
prices and quantities, Home country (%)
Empirical Baseline Constant Same Calvo
model markups parameter
Maximum response with expected sign (1 year after shock)
Rel. PPI -0.27 -0.19 -0.25 -0.03
Rel. Production -0.29 -0.32 -0.39 -0.04
Rel. Import price -0.97 -0.19 -0.25 -0.03
Rel. Import volume -0.38 -0.34 -0.43 -0.04
Average response 1 year after shock
Rel. PPI -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.02
Rel. Production -0.15 -0.28 -0.32 -0.02
Rel. Import price -0.32 -0.16 -0.19 -0.02
Rel. Import volume 0.08 -0.30 -0.36 -0.03
Response 6 months after shock
Rel. PPI -0.25 -0.18 -0.21 -0.02
Rel. Production -0.13 -0.31 -0.36 -0.03
Rel. Import price -0.97 -0.18 -0.22 -0.02
Rel. Import volume -0.38 -0.34 -0.42 -0.03
Notes: Relative prices (‘Rel. PPI’ and ‘Rel. Import price’) are defined
as prices of nondifferentiated goods relative to differentiated goods. Rel-
ative quantities (‘Rel. production’ and ‘Rel. Import volume’) are defined
as quantities of differentiated goods relative to nondifferentiated goods.
The values in second column (‘Empirical’) are based on central estimates
of the VAR-based impulse response functions (IRFs) depicted in Figures
1.3 and 1.4. The remaining three columns correspond to theoretical IRFs
for different model specifications. ‘Baseline model’ uses the benchmark
calibration. The model with ‘Constant markups’ sets the distribution
margins to a number close to zero (xN = xD ≈ 0), so the elasticities of
the markups are zero (ΓN = ΓN = 0). The model with ‘Same Calvo pa-
rameter’ assumes the same frequency of price adjustment for both sectors:
θN = θD = 0.93.
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From Table 1.4, it is evident that regardless of the measure that is utilized,
the model with a unique Calvo parameter severely underestimates the magnitudes
of the empirical IRFs. In contrast, both the baseline model and the model with
constant markups make considerable progress in terms of matching the empirical
impulse responses. Focusing on the short-run responses with expected signs, the
model is particularly successful in approximating the quantitative responses of the
relative PPIs and the relative import volumes. Thus, for example, 6 months after
the shock, the relative producer price declines by 0.18 percentage points in the model
and by 0.25 percentage points in the VAR. At the same horizon, the relative import
volume falls by 0.34 percentage points in the model and by 0.38 percentage points in
the VAR. That said, the model shows some limitations in replicating the subdued
reduction in relative quantities produced and, especially, the sizeable decline in
relative import prices.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper studies the effects of an aggregate nominal demand shock on prices
and quantities of nondifferentiated and differentiated manufactured goods. I use
U.S. data on producer prices and industrial production, as well as data on unit
values and volumes of trade, to construct measures of prices and quantities for these
sectors. A key empirical finding is that during recessions and in the wake of a
contractionary monetary policy shock, both the relative price of nondifferentiated
goods to differentiated goods and the relative quantity of differentiated goods to
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nondifferentiated goods decline.
I show that a two-country model featuring heterogeneity in price stickiness
generates meaningful differences in the adjustment of sectoral prices and quantities
following a demand disturbance. The model-based impulse responses of the relative
prices and quantities across sectors to a tightening monetary shock are in line with
the empirical evidence based on an estimated VAR. The numerical exercises also
show that the differences in sectoral price durations, which are calibrated using micro
data, constitute the central mechanism behind the quantitative findings. Although
the model includes variable markups based on distribution costs, this mechanism
by itself matters relatively little to the main results.
Overall, these findings add to the existing evidence in the closed economy liter-
ature that heterogeneity in price stickiness can explain significant differences in the
responses of sectoral prices and output to a monetary shock. I extend this conclu-
sion to the analysis of nondifferentiated and differentiated goods sectors and to an
open economy context. The results also imply that price-adjustment frictions help
explain why domestic and trade quantities of differentiated goods declined relatively
more than those of nondifferentiated goods in recent recessions. More generally, I
conclude that the incorporation of sectoral differences in nominal rigidities in the
quantitative analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations and international trade, within
the context of multi-sector frameworks, is a promising avenue for further research.
To improve the empirical fit of the model developed in this paper, several
extensions may be considered—e.g., the incorporation of features such as trade
in intermediate and capital goods, input-output production linkages, and sector-
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specific shocks. Another topic for future work is the explicit modeling of a rationale
for the different frequencies of price adjustment exhibited by nondifferentiated and
differentiated goods, rather than assuming such differences exogenously, as I have
done in this study.
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Chapter 2: Contractual Imperfections and the Impact of Crises on
Trade
Note: This chapter is coauthored with Renzo Castellares.
2.1 Introduction
Recent papers document the negative impact of crises on international trade.
For example, Abiad et al. (2014) find empirically that financial crises are associated
with significant declines in exports to the crisis country. In this paper, we argue that
contractual imperfections are important to understand the causality between crises
and trade disruptions. Our main finding is that exports to destinations in crisis are
disproportionately affected in industries that are more contractually vulnerable. In
this way, we provide empirical evidence on a new mechanism that has been thus far
ignored in the literature on crises and trade.
We first propose a simple model of trade to explain the relevance of industries’
contractual dependence during crises.1 Our theory builds on the intuition that when
international transactions are arranged in post-shipment terms (i.e., exporters are
paid by importers after delivery of the goods), the risk of default of importers
1Throughout the paper we use the expressions “contractual vulnerability” and “contractual
dependence” interchangeably.
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matters (Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013). Importers are presumably less likely to honor
their contracts when the state of their country’s economy is weak—as would be the
case if the economy were hit by a recession or if it entered into a financial crisis.
But the probability of repayment under post-shipment terms can also be affected
by industry-specific characteristics. In particular, when goods are more complex
and/or customized, it is harder to verify their quality in court and the market value
of the goods inside the original importer-exporter relationship is higher than outside
this relationship.2 Therefore exporters in some industries are more contractually
vulnerable than in others. We then show that when an importing country suffers an
adverse aggregate shock, a complementarity between contract enforcement at the
country level and contract dependence at the industry level gives rise to a larger
decline in imports in more contractually vulnerable industries. This is our key
theoretical insight.
Using disaggregated bilateral trade data, we quantify the importance of con-
tractual dependence at the industry level during crises. Our empirical approach
exploits the variation in the occurrence of crises across 118 importing countries
from 1989 to 2000, and the variation in contractual vulnerability across (up to) 351
SIC manufacturing industries. We simultaneously use three measures of crises in
our regressions: recessions alone, financial crises alone, and recessions with financial
crises. We confirm the negative average effects of crises on trade flows found in
previous papers, but we also show that trade declines disproportionately in more
2Some important references in the literature on incomplete contracts include Williamson (1979),
Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1999). See Berkowitz et al.
(2006) for an early study of the relationship between product complexity, contracting institutions,
and trade.
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contract-dependent industries. In most of our estimates, these sectoral effects are
statistically significant and economically important. This finding is the central con-
tribution of the paper.
We find that when crises involve recessions and financial disruptions at the
same time, the amplification effects associated with contractual dependence at the
industry level are stronger. According to one of our estimates, a recession with
financial crisis is associated with a 8.6% larger drop in imports in an industry that
is highly contract dependent relative to an industry that exhibits little dependence.
To put this result in perspective, we find that the average impact of a recession with
financial crisis on sectoral imports is close to −18%, while the analogous estimate
in the case of a recession alone is nearly −6%.3
Our main empirical results are mostly robust to the following exercises: (i)
extending the sample period back to 1980, (ii) controlling for industry measures
of financial vulnerability, (iii) controlling for industry measures of cyclicality (or
durability), (iv) controlling for industry measures of product differentiation, and
(v) considering alternative specifications of the estimating equation. We also find
evidence that in countries with lower institutional quality (proxied by the rule of law)
the amplification effect of contractual vulnerability on sectoral imports is greater.
We use three industry measures of contractual vulnerability. Two of them
are standard in the literature. The first one is the Nunn (2007) index of contract-
intensity of goods, measured by the value share of inputs that Nunn identifies as
3Our definition of recessions is based on the methodology of Braun and Larrain (2005) and our
definition of financial crises relies on Laeven and Valencia (2013).
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relationship-specific. Levchenko (2007) provides us with a second indicator, which
he constructs as an index of input-use concentration. Levchenko explicitly points
out that his index represents a measure of product complexity; in our paper, as
in Krishna and Levchenko (2012) and Hoefele et al. (2013), we make a similar
assumption in terms of the Nunn index. We introduce an additional novel measure
of contractual vulnerability, which we call the “uncollectible index”. By quantifying
the share of total account receivables uncollected compared to what was available to
collect in a given period, the uncollectible index directly reflects payment defaults
in business-to-business transactions. We obtain the data to construct this indicator
from the National Summary of Domestic Trade Receivables, a proprietary quarterly
survey of large U.S. firms. Our results are robust to the use of the Nunn, the
Levchenko, and the uncollectible indices.
As summarized in Antràs (2015), several difficulties underlie the contractual
imperfections associated with international transactions. First, it is sometimes dif-
ficult to determine which country’s laws apply to a particular contract, especially
since many contracts do not include a choice-of-law clause. Second, there is potential
bias of courts in favor of their national citizens. Third, it is practically impossible
in many cases to enforce decisions stipulated in a court’s verdict. Recent coordi-
nated attempts to reduce the contractual risk involving international transactions—
notably, the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods initiative, and resorting
to international arbitrators such as the International Chamber of Commerce—have
fallen short of their objectives and constitute partial solutions at best. Quoting Ro-
drik (2000), Antràs (2015) concludes that ultimately international contracts remain
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incomplete.
This paper is related to the literature on the impact of financial crises and
recessions on trade (Levchenko et al., 2010; Eaton et al., 2011; Berman et al., 2012;
Bricongne et al., 2012; Chor and Manova, 2012; Bems et al., 2013; Abiad et al.,
2014). A large part of this literature analyzes the so-called Great Trade Collapse
of 2008–09. These papers have documented the role of several mechanisms, such
as composition effects, protectionism, supply chains, credit constraints, and ex-
change rate dynamics. Our work contributes to this literature by emphasizing a
new mechanism—contractual imperfections—that helps explain the important ef-
fects of crises on trade, and the heterogeneous impact across industries.
Our theoretical mechanism heavily relies on the role of default risk in trade.
Other recent papers also study the implications of importers’ repayment probability,
but they mainly focus on a different problem, namely how this risk affects the choice
of financing terms that support international trade (Hoefele et al., 2013; Schmidt-
Eisenlohr, 2013; Ahn, 2014; Antràs and Foley, forthcoming).
Finally, this paper is connected to the literature on contracting institutions and
trade (see Antràs, 2015 and Nunn and Trefler, 2014 for comprehensive reviews). A
large bulk of this research has studied the relationship between domestic institutions
and comparative advantage. Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) constitute seminal
contributions to that literature. Our use of the contractual-vulnerability indices
introduced in those two papers to analyze the effects of crises on trade is new
relative to previous work.
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2.2 A simple framework of trade and contractual imperfections
To fix ideas, we propose a static, partial equilibrium model of trade. The model
incorporates contractual frictions in a reduced-form way, which reflect contracting
imperfections affecting the outputs produced by different industries. We then use
the model to derive our main testable implications.4
2.2.1 Setup
Basic assumptions. Our framework is in line with the traditional monopo-
listic competition models of trade. In each country, a continuum of firms produce
differentiated goods in multiple industries (sectors), indexed by s, using labor (sup-
plied inelastically). A numeraire sector produces a freely-traded homogeneous good
under constant returns to scale. Relative wages are pinned down by productivity in
this numeraire sector. Preferences are identical across countries and are described by
a Cobb-Douglas utility function. For country i, the utility function is Ui =
∏
s
Cµsis ,
defined over CES consumption indices Cis =
(∫
Ωis
xis(ω)
(σ−1)/σdω
)σ/(σ−1)
, where ω
is a variety, Ωis is the set of available varieties, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution,
and µs is the sectoral expenditure share.
Production technology in the differentiated sectors exhibits increasing returns
to scale. A firm from sector s in country e that sell xeis units of a good to an
importer in country i faces the cost function weτeixeis + fei, where we is the wage
4For simplicity the model is written in terms of final goods, but its key implications could be
generalized for transactions involving intermediate inputs as well.
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rate, τei > 1 is an iceberg trade cost, and fei is a fixed cost in units of the numeraire.
Since local sales are immaterial for our purposes, we can simply assume that fii = 0.
Post-shipment payment. We assume that exporters are risk neutral and use
open account contracts, meaning that they are paid by importers after delivery of the
goods. (Importers can be thought as wholesalers who sell to domestic consumers.)
Using trade data at the transaction level, Antràs and Foley (forthcoming) (U.S.)
and Ahn (2014) (Chile and Colombia) show that in terms of payment methods,
open account contracts comprise the majority of international transactions, both by
number and by value. Asmundson et al. (2011) report a similar finding for worldwide
trade based on survey data.5
Contractual frictions. Importers in country i are assumed to honor their
contractual obligations (i.e., pay in full and on time to exporters) with probability
λi. We assume that this probability increases with aggregate real expenditure in the
importing country, Yi. That is, λi is procyclical: λi = λ(Yi), with λ
′(Yi) ≡ ∂λi∂Yi > 0.
A simple way to interpret this assumption is that in the wake of an adverse
aggregate demand or financial shock in country i, some importing firms become
insolvent or illiquid and are unable to pay in full and/or on time. In support
of this argument, Mora and Powers (2011) document the increased perception of
counterparty risk among international traders during the 2008 crisis, evidenced by
the fact that exporters raised their demand for low-risk financing. Similarly, Auboin
and Engemann (2014) use a comprehensive database of export credit insurance
5Payment under open account terms typically occurs between one and three months after the
goods arrive to the importer’s location.
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covering 91 countries and find that the risk of international trade, as proxied by
claims paid on insured open account contracts, steadily increased during the acute
phase of the 2008 crisis. Additionally, Jacobson et al. (2013) use data on Swedish
businesses and document that the output gap is a good predictor of firm insolvency.
In the context of models of trade financing terms, Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013)
and Antràs and Foley (forthcoming) propose a related setup in which λi represents
instead a structural index of the quality of contracting institutions in country i. In
one of our empirical exercises below, we take that modeling approach into account
by dividing our sample of importing countries into two groups: countries with weak
and strong rule of law.
We also assume that contract enforcement has an additional industry-specific
dimension, captured by the index zs ∈ [0, 1]. A higher value of zs implies that the
good s is more contract dependent, in the sense that it is more complex and hence
more sensitive to imperfect contracting. Intuitively, complex goods require a high
share of relationship-specific inputs and often involve customization. Moreover, the
quality of a complex good can be difficult to verify in court. Importers of this type
of goods are thus more likely to renege on the contract due to disagreement on
the quality of the delivered products.6 Further, due to their customized nature,
complex goods may be hard to resell, so their market value outside the original
importer-exporter relationship arguably declines following an importer’s default.
As in Hoefele et al. (2013), we assume a complementarity between contract
6According to Burstein and Gopinath (2014), a typical trade credit insurance contract covers
against defaults due to insolvency, but not due to disagreement. In their analysis of trade credit
defaults among French firms, Burstein and Gopinath (2014) document that the most prevalent
reason for defaulting on trade credit is disagreement, followed by illiquidity and insolvency.
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enforcement at the importing-country level and contract dependence at the industry
level. In particular, we assume that the probability of enforcement in country i and
sector s is given by λis = λ
zs
i . For a given λi, higher values of zs associated with
more complex goods imply a lower effective probability of contract enforcement in
country i. For the least contract dependent product, zs = 0, the importer in country
i honors the contract with probability λis = 1.
7
The exporter’s problem. An exporter in country e and sector s maximizes
her expected profits from selling to country i, which are given by:
πeis = λispeisxeis − weτeixeis − fei (2.1)
Exporters choose prices recognizing the risk of default. Following Antràs and Foley
(forthcoming), equation (2.1) assumes that importers have no wealth and are pro-
tected by limited liability, so that they cannot pay beyond the market value of the
purchased goods.8
The exporter decides on the optimal price peis, taking as given the demand for
her varieties, xeis =
(
peis
Pis
)−σ
µsPiYi
Pis
, where Yi, Pi and Pis =
(∫
Ωis
pis(ω)
1−σdω
)1/(1−σ)
are specific to the importer’s country, and represent aggregate real expenditure (or,
with balanced trade, real GDP), the overall consumer price index, and the price
index in sector s, respectively. We treat Yi, Pi and Pis as exogenous and solve for
7Hoefele et al. (2013) and Demir and Javorcik (2014) find empirically that for a given quality of
institutions in the importing country, more complex goods are less likely to be exported on open
account terms, and more likely to be exported on cash in advance or bank-intermediated terms.
Yet, using detailed exports data, Ahn (2014) (Chile and Colombia) and Demir and Javorcik (2014)
(Turkey) report that the share of complex goods traded on open account terms is very high—around
70% to 80%.
8For a related model that incorporates incentive-compatibility and participation constraints to
enforce international payments, see chapter 3 in Antràs (2015).
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the optimal sectoral export price and quantity decisions in partial equilibrium.
2.2.2 Main theoretical predictions
In equilibrium, the export value in sector s is given by:
peisxeis =
[
σ
σ − 1
1
λis
weτei
]1−σ
µsPiYi
P 1−σis
(2.2)
Equation (2.2) shows that the export value is a function of standard variables (con-
stant markup over marginal cost, relative price, and sectoral expenditure), but is
also an increasing function of the probability of contract enforcement λis. Intu-
itively, the riskiness of the transaction acts as wedge on the price, and this wedge
increases when the exporter is more likely to face a default. Therefore, the lower
the λis, the higher is the optimal price peis and the lower is the quantity exported
to country i, xeis. The model thus predicts that for a given industry s, a “crisis” in
country i (represented by a decline in Yi) reduces the export value to that country,
peisxeis, because of the assumed procyclical movement of λi (and hence of λis; first
term in equation (2.2)). This mechanism works on top of a direct demand effect
(second term in (2.2)).
Furthermore, the impact of a crisis in the importing country on peisxeis is
amplified in more contract-dependent industries. Formally, consider the effect of
the industry measure of contractual vulnerability zs on the export value response to
a decline in Yi. The elasticity of the sectoral export value with respect to Yi is:
εpx,s ≡ −
∂peisxeis
∂Yi
Yi
peisxeis
= (1− σ) zs
λ′(Yi)Yi
λi
− 1 (2.3)
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Since 1−σ < 0, equation (2.3) shows that εpx,s < 0. The first term on the right-hand
side of (2.3) again indicates that, all else equal, sectoral exports fall as macroeco-
nomic conditions in the destination country i deteriorate and the country-specific
probability of contract enforcement λi decreases. But crucially, a higher value of zs
magnifies the decline in exports in industry s to country i. This prediction consti-
tutes our main testable implication. Meanwhile, the second term on the right-hand
side of (2.3) implies a unit demand elasticity, common to all industries, which nat-
urally follows from our CES demand assumption.
In the absence of firm or consumer heterogeneity, the predictions of the model
are directly applicable to country-industry trade flows.
2.3 Empirical strategy
In this section we explain our empirical methodology and describe the data
to be used in the regression analysis. The sources of our data are summarized in
Appendix Table B.1.
2.3.1 Methodology
We estimate the following baseline equation to test the hypothesis that the
negative trade effects of a crisis in the destination country are amplified in industries
64
with higher contractual vulnerability:
lnXeist =
3∑
k=1
αk Crisis
k
it +
3∑
k=1
βk Crisis
k
it × zs +
ηΥit + δΘet + ϕΨeit + γeis + γt + εeist,
(2.4)
where lnXeist represents the log of exports of country e to country i in industry s
at time t. Crisiskit is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the importing
country i suffers a crisis at time t, and 0 otherwise. The superscript k ∈ {1, 2, 3} de-
notes a specific measure of crisis, as defined below. In line with the model, we expect
the coefficients associated with crises to be negative (αk < 0). These coefficients
capture the average effect of crises on industry imports of the crisis country.
We incorporate three measures of crises in the regressions. In particular,
Crisisk is defined as:
Crisisk =

Recession alone , if k = 1
Financial Crisis alone , if k = 2
Recession and Financial Crisis , if k = 3
,
where ‘Recession alone’ captures an economic downturn without a financial crisis,
‘Financial Crisis alone’ characterizes a financial disruption that is not accompa-
nied by a recession, and ‘Recession and Financial Crisis’ captures the simultaneous
occurrence of both of these events.
To identify the amplification effect of crises in industries with higher contrac-
tual vulnerability, we include interaction terms of Crisiskit with zs, a demeaned index
that represents the degree of contractual vulnerability of industry s. Our model’s
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key prediction is that the coefficients associated with these interaction terms are
negative (βk < 0). That is, imports of the crisis country decline disproportionately
in more contract-dependent industries. We identify βk by relying on the variation
of contractual vulnerability across industries, and the occurrence (or not) of crises
in importing countries across years.
Additionally, equation (2.4) includes a first set of control variables, Υit, that
contains the log of real GDP (as a proxy for market size and demand) and the
degree of financial development of the importing country. A second set of controls,
Θet, includes the log of real GDP and the degree of financial development of the
exporting country. The final set of controls, Ψeit, includes the log of the bilateral
real exchange rate and a dummy variable that captures whether the trading partners
have a free trade agreement at time t.
We add proxies for financial development in the estimating equation for three
reasons. First, financing conditions at the country level affect decisions on trade fi-
nance terms (e.g., using open account or cash in advance), as documented in Antràs
and Foley (forthcoming) and Hoefele et al. (2013). Second, trade is intensive in
working capital, and as such it depends on financial conditions (Manova, 2013).
Third, financial development might reflect to some extent the general contractual
environment.9 The regression also includes an interaction term of financial develop-
ment of both the exporting and importing country. We expect a negative coefficient
on this interaction term under the consideration that the more financially developed
9Measures of contractual enforcement at the country level are typically unavailable for a wide
range of countries and for a long span of years. Some indicators included in the International
Country Risk Guide constitute an exception, but these data are not publicly available.
66
the exporting country is, the lower may be the relevance of the importing country
as a source of financing for trade, and vice versa.
Equation (2.4) also includes fixed effects at the exporter-importer-industry
level, γeis, and at the year level, γt. The inclusion of γeis in equation (2.4) accounts for
time-invariant bilateral characteristics such as distance, common language, contigu-
ity or colonial links, and any specific relationship between a pair of trading partners
at the industry level.10 Additionally, γeis also accounts for the time-invariant com-
ponent of multilateral trade resistance effects (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).
Finally, γt captures factors that affect all countries in the same period, such as global
recessions or changes in commodity prices. We compute clustered standard errors
at the importing country-year level. Below we perform several robustness checks.
2.3.2 Data
Country-industry trade flows. We use annual data on bilateral trade flows
obtained from the Feenstra et al. (2005) World Trade Flows database. These data
are originally organized by the 4-digit Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC), Revision 2. Since our key industry variables are constructed for 4-digit U.S.
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industries, we convert the trade data to this
format by replicating the concordance method from Cuñat and Melitz (2012).11
10By specific relationship we mean, for example, a situation in which the exporter may not be
not selling exactly the same product to every destination, or using the same payment method to
sell a product across different destinations (to the extent that payment methods remain relatively
stable over time).
11We add up the value of disaggregated 10-digit Harmonized System (HS) U.S. annual exports
for the period 1989–2000, using the dataset constructed by Feenstra et al. (2002). Since this dataset
includes a concordance between HS, SITC and SIC categories, we derive concordance weights to
map the SITC codes into SIC categories. A similar procedure is also employed in Chor (2010).
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Our sample excludes zero trade flows, nonmanufacturing industries, and the
oil sector represented by the SIC code 2911. We deflate the export flows (originally
reported in current U.S. dollars) by using the world export price index from the
International Financial Statistics database. The results presented below, however,
are robust to using nominal trade values instead of real ones. Our final sample
covers the period 1989–2000 and it includes 127 exporting countries, 118 importing
countries, and (in most of our regressions) 351 SIC industries.12 We show a list of
the countries included in the sample in Table 2.1.
Recessions and financial crises. We identify crisis periods in importing countries
as years when these countries experience recessions alone, financial crises alone, or
both recessions and financial crises at the same time. In line with the spirit of the
theoretical model, we think of these events as periods of increasing importers’ risk
of default.
We use real GDP (obtained from the World Development Indicators database)
and the methodology of Braun and Larrain (2005) to construct indicators for reces-
sions. A recession in a given country is defined following a peak-to-trough criterion—
a trough occurs when cyclical GDP is more than one standard deviation below zero;
a local peak associated with a trough is a year in which cyclical GDP is higher than
in both the previous and the posterior years.13 We checked that our results are
12The endpoint in our sample period is determined by data availability, as the World Trade Flows
database is constructed until the year 2000. We start the analysis in 1989 because our concordance
method relies on the SITC to SIC-87 mapping that is readily available in the Feenstra et al. (2002)
dataset only since 1989 (see footnote 11). Our sample captures several clusters of recessions and
crises during the 1990s, as detailed below. We report a sensitivity analysis using data since 1980.
13The cyclical component of GDP is computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a lambda
parameter value of 6.25 (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). Whenever available, the cyclical component of
GDP is constructed using data from 1960 to 2012.
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Table 2.1
List of countries
Albania Czech Republic Kenya Portugal
Angola Denmark Korea, Rep. Russian Federation
Argentina Dominican Republic Kuwait Rwanda
Armenia Ecuador Kyrgyz Republic Saudi Arabia*
Australia Egypt, Arab Rep. Lao PDR Senegal
Austria El Salvador Latvia Singapore
Azerbaijan Equatorial Guinea Lithuania Slovak Republic
Bahamas * Estonia* Macao* Slovenia*
Bahrain* Ethiopia Madagascar South Africa
Bangladesh Fiji Malawi Spain
Barbados Finland Malaysia Sri Lanka
Belarus France Mali St. Kitts and Nevis*
Belgium Gabon Malta* Sudan
Belize Gambia Mauritania Suriname
Benin Georgia Mauritius Sweden
Bolivia Germany Mexico Switzerland
Brazil Ghana Moldova Syrian Arab Republic
Bulgaria Greece Mongolia Tanzania
Burkina Faso Guatemala Morocco Thailand
Burundi Honduras Mozambique Togo
Cambodia Hong Kong Nepal Trinidad and Tobago
Cameroon Hungary Netherlands Tunisia
Canada Iceland New Zealand Turkey
Central African Republic India Niger Uganda
Chad Indonesia Nigeria Ukraine
China Iran, Islamic Rep. Norway United Kingdom
Colombia Ireland Pakistan United States
Congo, Rep. Israel Panama Uruguay
Costa Rica Italy Paraguay Vietnam
Cote d’Ivoire Japan Peru Yemen, Rep.
Croatia * Jordan Philippines Zambia
Cyprus Kazakhstan Poland
Note: An asterisk (∗) indicates countries that appear in the sample only as exporters.
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not affected by using other definitions of recessions, such as years of negative GDP
growth rates.
We also define an indicator for financial disruptions. Following Abiad et al.
(2014), we identify financial crisis episodes as periods of banking or sovereign debt
crises, based on the Laeven and Valencia (2013) database that covers 129 countries
from 1970 to 2011. Laeven and Valencia’s criteria to define a systemic banking
crisis are: (i) significant signs of distress in the banking sector, such as liquidations,
losses, and/or bank runs; and (ii) significant banking policy intervention measures in
response to losses in the banking system. Laeven and Valencia also report sovereign
debt crises as episodes of sovereign debt default and/or restructuring. Importantly,
their data shows a marked increase in the number of crises during the 1990s, a period
that we fully cover in our analysis.14
Of the 118 importing countries in our sample, 78 (63) suffered a recession
(financial crisis) at some point between 1989 and 2000. The mean duration of a
recession is close to 2 years, and the mean duration of a financial crisis is almost 4
years. Focusing on the measures of crises employed in our regressions, Figure 2.1
shows that the share of recessions alone reaches a peak of nearly 30% in the early
1990, while the maximum share of observations characterized by both recessions
and financial crises is around 10%. The share of financial crises alone is fairly stable
across years (13%, on average) but it tends to decline slowly over the sample period.
The graph also reveals a comovement over time between the occurrence of recessions
14Countries of different levels of income experienced financial crises during the 1990s (e.g., Swe-
den, Malaysia, Mexico, Indonesia, and Kenya). Other spikes in the number of crises (which are
not covered by our sample period) are found in the early 1980s and during the Great Recession,
particularly in 2008.
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alone and the coincidence of recessions and financial crises, although the share of
recessions alone in most years is greater than that of the combination of recessions
and financial crises.
Figure 2.1
Share of observations with crises, by year
Notes: Recessions are identified using the Braun and Larrain (2005) methodology. Financial
crises are identified as banking or sovereign debt crises, using the Laeven and Valencia (2013)
dataset.
In our data, the existence of a non-trivial share of observations character-
ized by ‘financial crises alone’ is explained in part by the fact that sovereign debt
crises often last more years than the average recession. (On the contrary, banking
crises are relatively short-lived and tend to be more closely correlated with economic
downturns.) In a few other cases, the identification of periods simultaneously char-
acterized by recessions and financial crises is limited by the existence of missing
71
observations on some country GDP series.
Contractual vulnerability across industries. We need to identify industry
measures of contractual vulnerability as proxies for the industry-specific components
of contract enforcement described in the model.15 We first follow the literature and
use the Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) indices. These are available for our
desired level of sectoral disaggregation and are constructed using U.S. Input-Output
Tables. As is standard in related papers, we assume that the ranking of industries
remains stable across countries. This is a plausible assumption to the extent that
both of these indices reflect technological factors.16
Nunn (2007) aims to measure the contract intensity of industries, which he de-
fines as the fraction of an industry’s intermediate inputs that are relationship-specific
(i.e., that are either not traded on an organized exchange or for which no reference
price exists). A higher value of the Nunn (2007) index reflects a higher degree of an
industry’s sensitivity to imperfect institutions.17 Some of the most contract intensive
industries include Motor Vehicles and Passenger Car Bodies, Electronic Computers,
and Electromedical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus; some of the least contract
intensive industries are Poultry Slaughtering and Processing, Primary Smelting and
Refining of Copper, and Rice Milling. These examples are useful to illustrate the
relationship between product complexity and contract dependence described in the
15To our knowledge, there are no publicly available comprehensive datasets on firm defaults on
international transactions for disaggregated industries.
16We thank Davin Chor for kindly sharing his data on the Nunn and the Levchenko indices at
the 4-digit SIC level.
17In our analysis, the index corresponds to the zrs1 measure specified in Nunn (2007). We use
the Nunn index that relies on the Rauch (1999) conservative classification for its construction. For
more details, see Chor (2010) and its supplementary appendix.
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model.
The Levchenko (2007) index measures the sensitivity of an industry to institu-
tions such as contract enforcement and property rights. This index equals one minus
the Herfindahl index of an industry’s intermediate input use—an inverse measure
of the concentration mix of inputs, and hence a direct measure of exposure to hold-
up problems in the production process. Among the most institutionally intensive
industries are Fluid Power Pumps and Motors, Small Arms Ammunition, and Sur-
gical Appliances and Supplies; among the least institutionally intensive industries
are Meat Packing Plants, Creamery Butter, and Setup Paperboard Boxes.
We also use a novel measure of uncollected credit sales, labeled as “uncol-
lectible index”, as an additional index of industry contractual vulnerability. The
source of these data is the National Summary of Domestic Trade Receivables (NS-
DTR), a proprietary quarterly survey of large U.S. firms compiled by the Credit
Research Foundation (CRF). As detailed in Appendix B.2, we construct our index
as 1 − CEI, where CEI stands for the NSDTR’s Collection Effectiveness Index.
The CEI is acknowledged by the CRF as the most effective measure of credit and
collection performance. Our uncollectible index captures the share of total account
receivables uncollected compared to what was available to collect over a quarter.
The CEI is originally reported in the NSDTR as a median value for every 4-digit
SIC industry that registers at least 3 respondent firms.18
18The CRF (http://www.crfonline.org/) is a non-profit, member-run organization. Its mem-
bers include a large number of Fortune 1000 corporations. The NSDTR constitutes a unique data
source of performance indicators of domestic accounts receivable, defined as claims against cus-
tomers for goods sold domestically on credit, based on the answers of hundreds of Fortune 1000
U.S. firms from a broad cross section of industries. To our knowledge, the NSDTR has not been
used in recent academic literature. In the early years of the survey, however, Seiden (1964) used
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The uncollectible index is advantageous for our purposes as it reflects, by
construction, payment defaults in business-to-business transactions at the industry
level. In this sense, our index is better suited to capture the role of contractual
imperfections than other standard indicators of trade credit intensity, such as the
ratio of accounts receivable to sales and the ratio of accounts payable to the cost of
goods sold.19 To isolate the structural component of the uncollectible index we take
industry medians across quarters (2006q1–2010q4). A ranking of industries based
on the uncollectible index is displayed in Appendix Table B.2.
In using the uncollectible index for our empirical analysis, we assume that
domestic receivable performance can proxy for the quality of collection of foreign re-
ceivables. We also believe that since large firms are dominant in international trade,
the sample of Fortune 1000 firms surveyed by the CRF are representative of firms
engaged in overseas transactions. That said, we acknowledge that the uncollectible
index may not be, as desired, completely exogenous from the perspective of firms.
Another limitation is that we only have available data to construct this index for
110 industries.
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of the uncollectible index. Over one third
of the industries fail to collect 10% of their receivables or less. On the opposite
extreme, only about 10% of industries fail to collect 30% of their receivables or
more.
it in his pioneering study of the quality of trade credit, and Nadiri (1969) employed it to calculate
the delinquency rate on manufacturing accounts receivable and payable.
19It is worth noting that as part of our robustness checks, we control for the cash conversion
cycle, an industry measure of financial dependence constructed as 365 × accounts receivable/sales
− 365 × accounts payable/cost of goods sold + 365 × inventories/cost of goods sold.
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Figure 2.2
Distribution of the uncollectible index
Notes: The bars represent the histogram of the uncollectible index. The uncollectible index is
constructed as 1− CEI, where CEI is the Collection Effectiveness Index reported in the Credit
Research Foundation’s National Summary of Domestic Trade Receivables. We calculate (4-digit
SIC) industry medians over the period 2006q1-2010q4, and divide them by 100 to express them
as decimals.
Table 2.2 summarizes some descriptive statistics of our contractual vulnera-
bility indices. In this Table, the Nunn index is reported as “complexity” and the
Levchenko index appears as “concentration”. We maintain this notation in our re-
gression analysis below. As shown in Table 2.3, our three indices are positively and
significantly correlated at the 1% level. We find the highest correlation coefficient
between the complexity and the concentration indices. (Tables 2.2 and 2.3 also re-
port statistics and pairwise correlations for other industry indicators that will be
described below.)
Country-level data. As part of our control variables, we use information on Free
Trade Agreements (FTA) from de Sousa (2012). The bilateral real exchange rate is
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Table 2.2
Summary statistics: indicators of contractual
and financial vulnerability, at industry level
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Complexity 351 0.56 0.25 0.00 0.98
Concentration 351 0.86 0.11 0.21 0.97
Uncollectible 110 0.17 0.09 0.02 0.49
CashCycle 351 0.94 0.34 0.30 2.06
TangAssets 351 0.40 0.15 0.14 0.88
Notes: Industries are classified by 4-digit SIC. Complex-
ity is the input relationship-specificity index from Nunn
(2007). Concentration is the input concentration index
from Levchenko (2007). The source of these indices is Chor
(2010). Uncollectible is the account receivables’ collection
ineffectiveness index, based on data from the Credit Re-
search Foundation’s National Summary of Domestic Trade
Receivables. CashCycle is a measure of the time elapsed
between the moment a firm pays for its materials until the
collection on its sales (in hundreds of days). TangAssets
is a measure of tangible assets developed by Braun (2003).
The last two measures are constructed using data from
Compustat. See text for further details.
Table 2.3
Pairwise correlation coefficients: indicators of contractual and
financial vulnerability
Complexity Concentration Uncollectible CashCycle
Concentration 0.52
(0.00)
Uncollectible 0.45 0.26
(0.00) (0.01)
CashCycle 0.50 0.36 0.43
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TangAssets -0.57 -0.30 -0.18 -0.44
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
Notes: For definitions of the variables, see notes to Table 2.2. Correlations are
computed across 4-digit SIC industries, with p-values reported in parentheses.
76
constructed using data from the Penn World Table 8.1 (Feenstra et al., forthcoming).
Finally, financial development is proxied by the ratio of private credit by banks and
other financial institutions to GDP (Beck et al., 2000).
Table 2.4 displays summary statistics for all of our country-level variables,
including GDP and our indicators of crises. (The Table also includes statistics for
other variables which will be used in our sensitivity analysis below.)
Table 2.4
Summary statistics: trade and country-level data
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Recession alone 5538895 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00
Fin.Crisis alone 5538895 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Recession & Fin.Crisis 5538895 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Ln BRER 5538895 4.72 0.76 1.92 7.23
Ln GDP Imp. 5538895 25.77 2.00 18.80 30.08
Ln GDP Exp. 5538895 26.64 1.62 18.80 30.08
Fin. Develop. 5538895 0.65 0.47 0.00 2.28
FTA 5538895 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Contract Enforcement 5538895 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
Notes: Ln denotes natural logarithm and the variable names corre-
spond to those employed in the regression analysis. Recession alone,
Fin.Crisis alone, and Recession & Fin.Crisis are dummy variables at
the importing-country level; BRER is the bilateral real exchange rate;
GDP Imp. and GDP Exp. are the real GDP in importing and exporting
countries, respectively; Fin. Develop. is the ratio of private credit to
GDP; FTA denotes free trade agreement (dummy variable); and Con-
tract Enforcement is measured by the rule of law. See text and Appendix
Table B.1 for further details.
2.4 Results
This section shows the results of estimating our baseline regression and dif-
ferent robustness exercises. The total number of data points in most of the regres-
sions is above 5 million. When we use the uncollectible index as our contractual-
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vulnerability measure, the number of observations decreases because fewer indus-
tries have values for this index relative to Nunn’s (2007) complexity and Levchenko’s
(2007) concentration indices.20
2.4.1 Baseline results
Table 2.5 presents the results of the OLS estimation of equation (2.4), us-
ing our three industry indices of contractual dependence. We first note that the
coefficients on most of the control variables are significant and have the expected
signs. Although the coefficient associated with financial development in the export-
ing country is not statistically significant, it is always positive, as expected.
In column 1, we show that when a country is hit by a crisis, the average impact
on its industry imports is negative, even after controlling for demand. Following
the notation of equation (2.4), the point estimate of αk is statistically significant
at the 1% level when a crisis is measured either by a recession alone (α1) or a
financial crisis accompanied by a recession (α3), but not significant for a financial
crisis alone (α2). As implied by the significant coefficients, industry imports of the
crisis country decline on average 5.5% (exp(−0.057)− 1) following a pure recession,
and 18.1% (exp(−0.200)−1) in the aftermath of a recession with financial crisis. Our
quantitative estimate of the combined effect of recessions and financial disruptions
on imports is similar to the findings of Abiad et al. (2014). They document that in
the year after a crisis, imports fall, on average, 19%.
20Our panel is unbalanced since not all countries trade in all industries and years. Moreover,
not all of our control variables are available for every country over the entire sample period.
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Table 2.5
Effects of crises and contractual vulnerability on trade across countries and
industries. Dependent variable: Ln(bilateral sectoral imports)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recession alone -0.057*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.056***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Fin.Crisis alone -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.004
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Recession & Fin.Crisis -0.200*** -0.195*** -0.196*** -0.190***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Recession alone × Complexity -0.132***
(0.026)
Fin.Crisis alone × Complexity -0.035
(0.036)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Complexity -0.224***
(0.038)
Recession alone × Concentration -0.276***
(0.046)
Fin.Crisis alone × Concentration -0.089
(0.064)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Concentration -0.401***
(0.069)
Recession alone × Uncollectible -0.296***
(0.056)
Fin.Crisis alone × Uncollectible -0.066
(0.085)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Uncollectible -0.432***
(0.100)
Ln BRER -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.332***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Ln GDP Imp. 0.736*** 0.736*** 0.736*** 0.695***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.097)
Ln GDP Exp 1.400*** 1.400*** 1.401*** 1.430***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
FTA 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.275***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Fin. Develop. Imp. 0.415*** 0.415*** 0.415*** 0.447***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Fin. Develop. Exp. 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.032
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032)
Fin. Develop. Imp*Exp -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.189***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Observations 5,538,895 5,538,895 5,538,895 2,077,588
R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.903
Importer-Exporter-Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by destination-year, with ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. ‘Recession’ and ‘Fin.Crisis’ are associated with
importing countries. ‘Complexity’, ‘Concentration’, and ‘Uncollectible’ are demeaned.
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Once we include the interactions of the crisis indicators with our industry
measures of contractual vulnerability (columns 2-4 in Table 2.5), we observe that
the estimated coefficients on these interaction terms are negative (βk < 0). These
coefficients are statistically significant, except when crises are measured as finan-
cial crises alone. In short, we confirm our key hypothesis that imports in more
contract-dependent industries are disproportionately affected by crises—especially
when crises involve recessions. This result is robust to the use of the complexity,
concentration or uncollectible indices. For the case of the complexity index, our
estimates imply that a one-standard-deviation increase from its mean magnifies the
decline in imports from 5.5% to 8.6% following a recession alone, and from 18.1%
to 23.1% following a recession and financial crisis.21
To further explore the amplification effect induced by contractual vulnerability
at the industry level, we use our estimates for βk and compare the differential impact
of crises on trade across two specific industries. We define an industry in the 25th
percentile of each contractual-vulnerability index as a ‘slightly contract-dependent’
industry. Similarly, we define an industry in the 75th percentile of each contractual-
vulnerability index as a ‘highly contract-dependent’ industry. Table 2.6 summarizes
the results.
Focusing on the complexity index, the impact of a recession and financial crisis
on imports is 8.6 percentage points (exp(−0.090)− 1) larger in the highly contract-
dependent industry (Printed Circuit Boards, SIC 3672) than in the slightly contract-
21Analogously, the magnification effects on imports for the case of the concentration index are
from 5.5% to 8.2% (recession alone) and from 18.1% to 21.7% (recession and financial crisis). For
the uncollectible index, such effects are from 5.5% to 7.8% (recession alone) and from 18.1% to
21.3% (recession and financial crisis).
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Table 2.6
Amplification effects of contractual vulnerability on industry
imports: differential impact of crises (75th − 25th pctl)
Recession alone Fin.Crisis alone Recession & Fin.Crisis
(1) (2) (3)
Complexity -0.053*** -0.014 -0.090***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
Concentration -0.030*** -0.010 -0.043***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Uncollectible -0.039*** -0.009 -0.057***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.013)
Notes: The calculations are based on the estimates from Table 2.5 (columns
2-4), with ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% lev-
els. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The table shows the differen-
tial impact of crises on imports between highly and slightly contract-dependent
industries, for each industry measure of contractual vulnerability. The calcula-
tions assume that a highly (slightly) contract-dependent industry is in the 75th
(25th) percentile in the distribution of our measures of contractual vulnerability.
dependent industry (Steel Works, Blast Furnaces, and Rolling Mills, SIC 3312). For
the uncollectible index, following a recession and financial crisis, the industry with
high contract dependence exhibits a 5.5 percentage points (exp(−0.057)− 1) larger
drop in imports than the industry with low dependence (Construction Machinery
and Equipment, SIC 3531; and Paper Mills, SIC 2621, respectively). All the reported
differences between the 75th and the 25th percentiles are statistically significant (at
the 1% level), except when crises are measured as financial crises alone. Noticeably
also, the amplification effects conditional on a recession and financial crisis (column
3) are larger than those associated with a recession alone (column 1), roughly by a
factor of 1.5, on average.
81
2.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
To check the robustness of our findings we consider different exercises. We
begin by dividing the sample of importing countries according to their rule of law
index. We then verify the sensitivity of our results to changing the sample period,
introducing additional controls, and using alternative specifications of the estimating
equation. For the remainder of this section, all of the regressions include the same
control variables as the baseline estimation, but to save space they are omitted in
the tables.
2.4.2.1 Contract enforcement (rule of law) at the country level
We first test if the decline of imports among industries with higher contractual
dependence is more pronounced in countries with lower structural levels of contrac-
tual enforcement. This would be a reasonable outcome if, independently of the
industry, importing firms were more likely to default in countries with worse insti-
tutional quality (see, e.g., Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013); or alternatively, if poor institu-
tions disproportionately exacerbated the risk of default of more contract-dependent
industries. To measure a country’s ability to enforce contracts we use the rule of
law index from Kaufmann et al. (2010). We then split the sample according to
whether importing countries are above or below the median value of this indicator.
The results are shown in Table 2.7.
We find that, for the case of recessions and financial crises, the amplification
effects due to contractual vulnerability at the industry level are indeed larger in
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countries with low contract enforcement. Illustratively, as observed in columns and
2 and 4, the coefficient attached to the interaction of the recession and financial
crisis indicator and the complexity index is 21% higher (in absolute value) in the
low-enforcement sample than in the high-enforcement sample (−0.244 and −0.202,
respectively).
However, when crisis are measured by recessions alone, the evidence is mixed.
The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are higher (in absolute value) in
the low-enforcement sample than in the high-enforcement sample for the case of the
complexity index, but the opposite result holds when we use the concentration and
the uncollectible indices. Lastly, in both country samples, the point estimates on
the interaction terms with financial crisis alone are in most cases statistically not
significant.
Note also that crises associated with recessions have much larger average im-
pacts on sectoral imports of countries with low contract enforcement (columns 1
and 5). For example, in the wake of recessions alone, the estimated drop in im-
ports for this group of countries is 12.6% (exp(−0.135) − 1), compared to 3.0%
(exp(−0.030)− 1) for countries with high enforcement.
2.4.2.2 Extending the sample period
We next evaluate the robustness of our results to the use of data since 1980.
The results are reported in Table 2.8. In contrast to our baseline results, the coeffi-
cient that captures the average effect of a financial crisis alone on industry imports
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(α2) is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels (columns 1-3 and column 4,
respectively).
Table 2.8
Effects of crises and contract vulnerability on trade across countries and
industries: extended sample period (1980-2000). Dependent variable:
Ln(bilateral sectoral imports)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recession alone -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.053***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Fin.Crisis alone -0.053** -0.053** -0.052** -0.041*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Recession & Fin.Crisis -0.184*** -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.172***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Recession alone × Complexity -0.254***
(0.041)
Fin.Crisis alone × Complexity 0.023
(0.048)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Complexity -0.164***
(0.049)
Recession alone × Concentration -0.360***
(0.058)
Fin.Crisis alone × Concentration -0.065
(0.067)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Concentration -0.290***
(0.066)
Recession alone × Uncollectible -0.711***
(0.146)
Fin.Crisis alone × Uncollectible 0.179
(0.145)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Uncollectible -0.190
(0.161)
Observations 7,830,508 7,830,508 7,830,508 2,924,381
R-squared 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.859
Importer-Exporter-Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: See notes to Table 2.5. Standard errors are clustered by destination-year, with
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The regressions
include the same control variables as the baseline estimation (see Table 2.5).
The coefficients on the interaction terms change in dissimilar ways relative to
our baseline results. On one hand, the estimates on the interactions of a recession
alone with our three industry measures of contractual vulnerability (β1) are larger
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(in absolute value) when we use the extended sample period. On the contrary, the
coefficients of the interactions involving a recession with financial crisis (β3) are
smaller (in absolute value) than the baseline estimates, and even not significant
for the case of the uncollectible index. Overall, though, this exercise confirms that
imports in more contract-dependent industries are disproportionately affected by
recessions, either if these are accompanied by financial crises or not.
2.4.2.3 Controlling for financial vulnerability
Although our use of controls and fixed effects aims to mitigate concerns about
omitted variables, we allow for the possibility that our industry measures of con-
tractual vulnerability may pick up the effect of financial dependence. A financially
dependent industry could be affected by credit constraints as a result of facing
high fixed costs or significant working capital needs. In this exercise, we separately
include interaction terms of our recession indicator with standard measures of fi-
nancial dependence, which are based on data from Compustat’s annual industrial
files (period 1995–2012).
The first industry measure of financial vulnerability is the cash conversion cy-
cle (CashCycle), a proxy for short term financial needs to cover net working capital,
defined as the period between a firm’s payment for materials and the collection of its
sales (Raddatz, 2006). The second one is a measure of asset tangibility (TangAssets),
namely the share of net property, plant and equipment in total book-value assets
(Braun, 2003).22 Industries with higher values of CashCycle and with lower values of
22We drop firm-year observations with negative or missing values on sales and assets from the
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TangAssets are more financially dependent. Table 2.2 reports some summary statis-
tics for these variables. Further, Table 2.3 shows that there are some statistically
significant correlations between the contractual and the financial vulnerability indi-
cators. Notably, the complexity index exhibits a somewhat high negative correlation
with TangAssets and a positive correlation with CashCycle.
We confirm that the inclusion of the financial vulnerability indicators does not
substantially change our main findings. The results obtained with CashCycle and
TangAssets are presented in Table 2.9 and Appendix Table B.3, respectively.
The coefficients on the interactions of CashCycle and TangAssets with both
recession alone and recession and financial crisis have the expected signs. These
coefficients are statistically significant in all regressions, except in the ones that
include the complexity index. This likely reflects the correlations between the com-
plexity index and our two indicators of financial dependence, as mentioned above.
Meanwhile, the coefficients on the interactions involving financial crisis alone tend
to be close to zero and report large standard errors. In short, the bulk of our results
imply that trade in more financially-dependent industries is more negatively affected
during crises. This is consistent with the evidence in Chor and Manova (2012).
In unreported regressions, we also experiment with the Rajan and Zingales
(1998) index of external finance dependence (i.e., the ratio of the difference between
Compustat sample. To reduce the effect of outliers, we first sum each firm’s value of net property,
plant and equipment over the sample period and then divide by the sum of assets over the sample
period in order to construct TangAssets. An analogous procedure is followed to aggregate over
time the ratios involved in the construction of CashCycle. We then trim both 1% tails of the
firm distributions for each of the three measures and calculate industry medians. To gain observa-
tions, whenever a median value is not available for a SIC-4 industry, we impose the median value
computed for the immediately higher level of aggregation (SIC-3).
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Table 2.9
Effects of crises and contract vulnerability on trade across
countries and industries: controlling for financial vulnerability.
Dependent variable: Ln(bilateral sectoral imports)
(1) (2) (3)
Recession alone -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.058***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Fin.Crisis alone -0.011 -0.011 -0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Recession & Fin.Crisis -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.191***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Recession alone × Complexity -0.130***
(0.026)
Fin.Crisis alone × Complexity -0.044
(0.036)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Complexity -0.201***
(0.040)
Recession alone × Concentration -0.252***
(0.042)
Fin.Crisis alone × Concentration -0.099*
(0.054)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Concentration -0.319***
(0.066)
Recession alone × Uncollectible -0.224***
(0.052)
Fin.Crisis alone × Uncollectible -0.105
(0.072)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Uncollectible -0.343***
(0.087)
Recession alone × CashCycle -0.003 -0.022* -0.051***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018)
Fin.Crisis alone × CashCycle 0.012 0.008 0.028
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × CashCycle -0.032 -0.069*** -0.063***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025)
Observations 5,538,895 5,538,895 2,077,588
R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.903
Importer-Exporter-Industry FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Notes: See notes to Table 2.5. Standard errors are clustered by destination-year,
with ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
The regressions include the same control variables as the baseline estimation
(see Table 2.5). ‘CashCycle’ is demeaned.
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capital expenditures and cash flow over capital expenditures) as an additional mea-
sure of financial vulnerability. Our findings do not show a statistically significant
role for this variable, while the rest of our key results remain unchanged.
2.4.2.4 Controlling for cyclicality
Compositional effects and durability play a role in explaining trade collapses
in the aftermath of recessions and financial crises (see, e.g., Levchenko et al., 2010,
and Eaton et al., 2011). This is because international trade is intensive in cer-
tain product categories, such as investment and durable consumption goods, that
are more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations than other products. We next evaluate
the robustness of our baseline results to the inclusion of interaction terms of the
crisis indicators with dummy variables representing (loosely speaking) cyclical and
noncyclical goods.
We construct two dummy variables using the mapping of 4-digit SIC industries
to categories of final demand from Gomes et al. (2009). Our first dummy variable
(labeled as “Cyclical (exc. NX)”) takes the value of 1 (cyclical) if the industry is
categorized by Gomes et al. (2009) as durable consumption or investment, and takes
the value of 0 (noncyclical) if the industry is categorized as nondurable consumption,
government consumption and investment, consumption of services, or net exports.
Alternatively, a second dummy variable (labeled as “Cyclical (with NX)”) is con-
structed in the same way except that the category net exports is included within
the cyclical group.23
23Gomes et al’s (2009) classification covers the majority of SIC-4 industries. However, to gain
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To examine the relationship between contract dependence and cyclicality, we
use our first dummy variable to split the sample of industries according to whether
they are more or less cyclical. In Figure 2.3 we plot the distributions of the com-
plexity and the concentration indices for each subsample. (Using the second dummy
variable to split the sample yields relatively similar plots.)
Figure 2.3
Distribution of complexity index and concentration index, by cyclicality of
industries
Notes: The box-and-whisker plots show the interquartile range, the median, and the most
extreme values that are within 3/2 times the interquartile range of the 1st and 3rd quartiles.
Complexity is the input relationship-specificity index from Nunn (2007). Concentration is the
input concentration index from Levchenko (2007). Based on Gomes et al’s (2009) classification of
4-digit SIC industries by final demand, our cyclical industries include durable consumption and
investment goods; noncyclical industries include nondurable consumption, government
consumption and investment, consumption of services, and net exports of goods and services.
It is visually apparent that cyclical industries tend to be more contractually
vulnerable than noncyclical industries. This pattern is particularly strong if we
observations, whenever a certain SIC-4 industry is not categorized by them, we impose the category
of final demand corresponding to the immediately higher level of aggregation (SIC-3).
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observe the plots for the concentration index. More concretely, the median values of
the complexity and the concentration indices are higher for cyclical industries than
for noncyclical ones. The differences between medians are statistically significant
at the 1% level according to the adjusted median chi-square and the Kruskal-Wallis
tests.
The results with the first and the second dummy variable are displayed in Ta-
ble 2.10 and Appendix Table B.4, respectively. We find that our baseline estimates
are essentially unaffected when we account for the fact that crises can have a larger
negative impact on more cyclical goods. If anything, the magnitudes of the interac-
tion coefficients for the contractual-dependence measures decline slightly in absolute
value. Moreover, when the coefficients on the interactions with the cyclicality dum-
mies are statistically significant, recessions are found to disproportionately reduce
trade in cyclical goods relative to noncyclical goods by 3 to 5 percentage points.24
These results hold using either of our two dummy variables for cyclicality.
2.4.2.5 Controlling for product differentiation
As documented in Chapter 1, there is evidence that trade quantities of differ-
entiated goods decline relatively more than those of nondifferentiated goods during
recessions, even after controlling for features such as durability and end use. To
rule out the possibility that our measures of contractual dependence may pick up
the effect of product differentiation, we estimate a set of regressions that include
24This finding is consistent with previous evidence in the literature. For example, Abiad et al.
(2014) report that the recent Great Trade Collapse caused an additional average drop of 10% in
trade in capital and durable goods than in consumer nondurable goods.
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Table 2.10
Effects of crises and contract vulnerability on trade across countries and
industries: controlling for cyclicality. Dependent variable: Ln(bilateral
sectoral imports)
(1) (2) (3)
Recession alone -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.057***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Fin.Crisis alone -0.011 -0.011 -0.004
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Recession & Fin.Crisis -0.195*** -0.196*** -0.190***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Recession alone × Complexity -0.126***
(0.025)
Fin.Crisis alone × Complexity -0.037
(0.036)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Complexity -0.223***
(0.037)
Recession alone × Concentration -0.264***
(0.045)
Fin.Crisis alone × Concentration -0.093
(0.063)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Concentration -0.397***
(0.066)
Recession alone × Uncollectible -0.239***
(0.053)
Fin.Crisis alone × Uncollectible -0.075
(0.081)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Uncollectible -0.419***
(0.091)
Recession alone × Durables (exc. NX) -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.047***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
Fin.Crisis alone × Durables (exc. NX) 0.009 0.009 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Durables (exc. NX) -0.003 -0.008 -0.010
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019)
Observations 5,538,895 5,538,895 2,077,588
R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.903
Importer-Exporter-Product FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Notes: See notes to Table 2.5. Standard errors are clustered by destination-year,
with ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The
regressions include the same control variables as the baseline estimation (see Table
2.5).
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additional interaction terms of the crisis indicators with a new dummy variable.
We construct a dummy variable (that we call “Differentiation”) using the
Rauch (1999) product classification. This variable takes the value of 1 if an in-
dustry is classified by Rauch as differentiated, and 0 if an industry is identified as
nondifferentiated. The latter category includes goods traded in organized exchanges
or with reference prices.25
Table 2.11 shows that recessions alone and recessions with financial crises
generate a disproportional decline in the trade volumes of differentiated goods. Ac-
cording to our statistically significant results, the magnitude of this reduction is
between 4% and 5%. Furthermore, the amplification effects induced by contractual
vulnerability, captured by the interaction terms with our measures of contractual
dependence, are moderately smaller relative to the baseline regressions. In column
2, we also note that these amplification effects are statistically significant for the
case of financial crises alone, which stands in contrast to our baseline results.
2.4.2.6 Controlling for financial vulnerability, cyclicality, and prod-
uct differentiation
Building on previous exercises, we perform a sensitivity check that simultane-
ously includes extra interaction terms in our baseline regressions. These variables
aim to control for the potentially larger effect of crises on trade in industries with
25Since the Rauch (1999) classification is originally available at the SITC level, we previously
map Rauch’s categories into 4-digit SIC industries. To do so, we follow a similar procedure as
the one employed in Chapter 1 for the classification of NAICS industries as differentiated and
nondifferentiated (see Appendix A.1).
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Table 2.11
Effects of crises and contract vulnerability on trade across countries
and industries: controlling for product differentiation. Dependent
variable: Ln(bilateral sectoral imports)
(1) (2) (3)
Recession alone -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.058***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Fin.Crisis alone -0.011 -0.011 -0.004
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Recession & Fin.Crisis -0.195*** -0.196*** -0.191***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Recession alone × Complexity -0.123***
(0.023)
Fin.Crisis alone × Complexity -0.042
(0.029)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Complexity -0.215***
(0.032)
Recession alone × Concentration -0.243***
(0.038)
Fin.Crisis alone × Concentration -0.103**
(0.048)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Concentration -0.330***
(0.059)
Recession alone × Uncollectible -0.204***
(0.047)
Fin.Crisis alone × Uncollectible -0.060
(0.072)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Uncollectible -0.368***
(0.083)
Recession alone × Differentiation -0.009 -0.019 -0.053***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
Fin.Crisis alone × Differentiation 0.008 0.007 -0.004
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Differentiation -0.009 -0.038* -0.036
(0.018) (0.021) (0.026)
Observations 5,538,895 5,538,895 2,077,588
R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.903
Importer-Exporter-Industry FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Notes: See notes to Table 2.5. Standard errors are clustered by destination-year,
with ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
The regressions include the same control variables as the baseline estimation (see
Table 2.5).
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higher working capital necessities (CashCycle), in cyclical industries (Cyclical (exc.
NX)), and in differentiated goods industries (Differentiation).
Table 2.12 shows the results. We observe that the inclusion of the additional
control variables somewhat reduces the magnitude (in absolute value), but not the
statistical significance, of some of the key point estimates in our baseline regressions.
On the other hand, the interactions between both the complexity index and the
concentration index with financial crisis alone are now significant at the 10% level.
We therefore find evidence that even without recessions, financial disruptions by
themselves can lead to disproportionate declines in imports in more contractually
vulnerable industries.
2.4.2.7 Time-variant multilateral trade resistance
By including exporter-importer-industry fixed effects, our baseline specifica-
tion captures the time-invariant dimension of the multilateral trade resistance term.
In another set of regressions, we capture the time-varying component of multilat-
eral resistance under two alternative specifications. First, we incorporate exporter-
industry and importer-industry fixed effects, letting them vary by 6-year periods.
This method allows for the possibility that the time-variant multilateral resistance
term be industry-specific. Second, we consider a specification that omits the year
fixed effects but includes exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects. Under this
methodology, the newly introduced fixed effects subsume the average impact of crises
on industry imports, and hence we are no longer able to identify the parameter αk.
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Table 2.12
Effects of crises and contract vulnerability on trade across
countries and industries: controlling for financial vulnerability,
cyclicality, and differentiation. Dependent variable:
Ln(bilateral sectoral imports)
(1) (2) (3)
Recession alone -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.058***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Fin.Crisis alone -0.011 -0.011 -0.003
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Recession & Fin.Crisis -0.195*** -0.194*** -0.192***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Recession alone × Complexity -0.122***
(0.024)
Fin.Crisis alone × Complexity -0.050*
(0.029)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Complexity -0.197***
(0.034)
Recession alone × Concentration -0.227***
(0.037)
Fin.Crisis alone × Concentration -0.109**
(0.043)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Concentration -0.284***
(0.059)
Recession alone × Uncollectible -0.151***
(0.049)
Fin.Crisis alone × Uncollectible -0.093
(0.067)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Uncollectible -0.320***
(0.077)
Recession alone × CashCycle 0.005 -0.011 -0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Fin.Crisis alone × CashCycle 0.010 0.004 0.034*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.020)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × CashCycle -0.030 -0.062*** -0.052*
(0.021) (0.020) (0.027)
Recession alone × Durables (exc. NX) -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.041***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Fin.Crisis alone × Durables (exc. NX) 0.008 0.008 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Durables (exc. NX) -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020)
Recession alone × Differentiation -0.008 -0.014 -0.045***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
Fin.Crisis alone × Differentiation 0.006 0.006 -0.013
(0.015) (0.018) (0.021)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Differentiation -0.005 -0.023 -0.022
(0.018) (0.021) (0.027)
Observations 5,538,895 5,538,895 2,077,588
R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.903
Importer-Exporter-Product FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Notes: See notes to Table 2.5. Standard errors are clustered by destination-year,
with ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The
regressions include the same control variables as the baseline estimation (see Table 2.5).
CashCycle’ is demeaned.
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The results are summarized in Table 2.13. Columns 1-3 correspond to the
first specification, and columns 4-6 refer to the second specification. We confirm
the majority of our baseline findings, although some differences are worth noting.
In particular, in columns 1-3 we show that financial crises alone generate a statis-
tically significant average decline in imports (of around 5%). Additionally, as in
some previous robustness checks, we find that the amplification effects of contrac-
tual vulnerability conditional on a financial crises alone are statistically significant
(columns 1-2 and 4-6). Finally, under the first specification, the amplification effects
associated with recessions alone are smaller than in the baseline model, as implied
by the point estimates of β1.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper we provide evidence on a mechanism that has been ignored in the
existing literature on crises and trade. We document empirically that when countries
experience recessions and financial disruptions, their imports fall disproportionately
in more contract-dependent industries. Put differently, contractual imperfections at
the product level exacerbate the negative impact of crises on international trade.
This mechanism operates on top of other relevant sources of heterogeneity across
industries, such as financial dependence, degree of cyclicality, and product differen-
tiation. Moreover, the estimated amplification effect of contractual vulnerability on
sectoral imports appears to strengthen if the crisis country has weak rule of law.
We argue that these findings can be rationalized by two considerations. First,
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a large share of cross-border transactions rely on post-shipment payment. Second,
the risk of default of importers is affected by macroeconomic conditions and worsens
in industries which are more sensitive to the quality of contracting institutions.
Our quantitative findings may seem surprising in light of some considerations
that could downplay the risk of default faced by exporters. First, although post-
shipment terms are the most prevalent payment method in trade, other safer alter-
natives include cash in advance and bank-intermediated financing terms. Second,
the use of intermediaries for exporting is relatively widespread. Third, exporters
may purchase insurance against defaults based on insolvency. Fourth, for the sub-
stantial fraction of trade that occurs among related parties, contractual frictions are
presumably less relevant. In spite of all of these arguments, our results robustly in-
dicate that contract enforcement at the importing-country and industry level plays
a significant role in shaping the response of trade to crises. We would require finer
data to evaluate the importance of each of the aforementioned considerations. In
addition, it would be interesting to disentangle the roles of the extensive margin and
the intensive margin of trade in our story. We see our paper as a first step towards
tackling those issues.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Methodological details
Classification of NAICS industries as nondifferentiated and differen-
tiated. To map the Rauch (1999) categories into several levels of aggregation in the
NAICS classification of manufacturing industries (see Table A.1), I use the 4-digit
SITC to 10-digit HS (HS10) concordance and the HS10 to 6-digit NAICS concor-
dance from Feenstra et al. (2002). The Rauch classification is obtained from Jon
Haveman’s International Trade Data web page. Rauch classifies goods within three
types of product categories depending on their dominant method of sale: products
traded on organized exchanges, which are essentially commodities; goods that have a
reference price (i.e., they are listed in trade catalogues); and differentiated products,
which cannot be priced by either of the former means. He also provides a “conserva-
tive” and a “liberal” classification—the former minimizes the number of goods classi-
fied as organized exchanges or reference prices, while the latter maximizes their num-
ber. I use the conservative classification, but my results are unchanged if I use the
liberal one. I specifically employ disaggregated data on U.S. trade flows from 2006
assembled by Robert Feenstra, available on http://www.internationaldata.org/.
The original source of Feenstra’s data is the U.S. Census Bureau. In particular, I
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use the export and import values at the HS10 level to label a given NAICS code
as nondifferentiated, differentiated or unclassified in the following way: if a certain
Rauch category captures at least 70% of trade of a NAICS aggregate, I assign that
Rauch category to the industry in question; otherwise, I leave the NAICS industry
unclassified. This mapping method is developed for the 3-, 4-, 5- and 6-digit NAIC
Systems. For illustrative purposes, Table A.1 displays the complete classification of
4-digit NAICS industries. I checked that the results are not affected by using data
on U.S. trade flows from other years (in particular, 2001 and 1996).
Table A.1
Classification of manufacturing industries by product differentiation at the 4-digit
NAICS level
Code Classific. Industry Description
3111 N Animal Foods
3112 N Grain and Oilseed Milling Products
3113 U Sugar and Confectionery Products
3114 U Fruit and Vegetable Preserves and Specialty Foods
3115 N Dairy Products
3116 N Meat Products and Meat Packaging Products
3117 N Seafood Products Prepared, Canned and Packaged
3118 D Bakery and Tortilla Products
3119 D Foods, NESOI
3121 N Beverages
3122 N Tobacco Products
3131 N Fibers, Yarns, and Threads
3132 D Fabrics
3133 D Finished and Coated Textile Fabrics
3141 D Textile Furnishings
3149 D Other Textile Products
3151 D Knit Apparel
3152 D Apparel
3159 D Apparel Accessories
3161 D Leather and Hide Tanning
3162 D Footwear
3169 D Other Leather Products
3211 D Sawmill and Wood Products
3212 N Veneer, Plywood, and Engineered Wood Products
3219 D Other Wood Products
3221 N Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mill Products
3222 U Converted Paper Products
3231 D Printed Matter and Related Product, NESOI
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Table A.1 (continued)
3241 U Petroleum and Coal Products
3251 N Basic Chemicals
3252 U Resin, Synthetic Rubber, & Artificial & Synthetic Fibers & Filiment
3253 N Pesticides, Fertilizers and Other Agricultural Chemicals
3254 D Pharmaceuticals and Medicines
3255 D Paints, Coatings, and Adhesives
3256 D Soaps, Cleaning Compounds, and Toilet Preparations
3259 D Other Chemical Products and Preparations
3261 D Plastics Products
3262 D Rubber Products
3271 D Clay and Refractory Products
3272 D Glass and Glass Products
3273 U Cement and Concrete Products
3274 D Lime and Gypsum Products
3279 D Other Nonmetallic Mineral Products
3311 U Iron and Steel and Ferroalloy
3312 U Steel Products From Purchased Steel
3313 N Alumina and Aluminum and Processing
3314 N Nonferrous Metal (Except Aluminum) and Processing
3315 U Foundries
3321 D Crowns, Closures, Seals and Other Packing Accessories
3322 D Cutlery and Handtools
3323 U Architectural and Structural Metals
3324 U Boilers, Tanks, and Shipping Containers
3325 D Hardware
3326 U Springs and Wire Products
3327 D Bolts, Nuts, Screws, Rivets, Washers and Other Turned Products
3329 D Other Fabricated Metal Products
3331 U Agriculture and Construction Machinery
3332 D Industrial Machinery
3333 D Commercial and Service Industry Machinery
3334 D Ventilation, Heating, Air-Conditioning, and Commercial Refrigera-
tion Equipment
3335 D Metalworking Machinery
3336 D Engines, Turbines, and Power Transmission Equipment
3339 D Other General Purpose Machinery
3341 U Computer Equipment
3342 D Communications Equipment
3343 D Audio and Video Equipment
3344 D Semiconductors and Other Electronic Components
3345 D Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Control Instruments
3346 D Magnetic and Optical Media
3351 D Electric Lighting Equipment
3352 D Household Appliances and Miscellaneous Machines, NESOI
3353 D Electrical Equipment
3359 D Electrical Equipment and Components, NESOI
3361 D Motor Vehicles
3362 D Motor Vehicle Bodies and Trailers
3363 D Motor Vehicle Parts
3364 U Aerospace Products and Parts
3365 U Railroad Rolling Stock
3366 D Ships and Boats
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Table A.1 (continued)
3369 D Transportation Equipment, NESOI
3371 D Household and Institutional Furniture and Kitchen Cabinets
3372 D Office Furniture (Including Fixtures)
3379 D Furniture Related Products, NESOI
3391 D Medical Equipment and Supplies
3399 U Miscellaneous Manufactured Commodities
Notes: Calculations based on U.S. trade data, the conservative classification of goods by
Rauch (1999), and the HS-NAICS-SITC concordance from Feenstra et al. (2002). The
first column is the 4-digit NAICS code of the industry. The second column indicates
the classification of the industry: nondifferentiated goods (“N”), differentiated goods
(“D”), or unclassified (“U”).
Construction of measures of sectoral trade prices and volumes. As
explained in section 1.3.3, I construct measures of sectoral trade volumes and prices
(unit values) using disaggregated data on U.S. exports and imports from the USITC
at the 4-digit NAICS level. Since the USITC reports trade volume data for all of
the different units in which transactions are recorded (e.g., kilograms, liters, dozens,
etc.), a unique NAICS code frequently features non-zero monthly observations for
several different units. For simplicity, to construct the sectoral measures of volumes
and prices I work with the unit that captures the largest fraction of total trade value
within each NAICS code—in most cases, this means the unit that captures over 50%
of trade in each industry. Naturally, the predominant unit is not necessarily the same
across all industries, so before computing the sectoral averages I transform the trade
volume series at the industry level into indices normalized to a common base period.
To be consistent, I also transform the industry-level series for unit values (originally
reported in dollars) into indices. (Although the BLS publishes data on export and
import price indices at the 4-digit NAICS level, these series are only available since
2005, so their number of observations was insufficient to be used in the econometric
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analysis.)
Calibration of sectoral expenditure shares. To classify the NIPAs for
nondurable PCE categories as nondifferentiated and differentiated, I map the Rauch
categories into the commodities in the I-O accounts included in each PCE category.
I proceed in three steps. First, I use my own classification of NAICS industries as
nondifferentiated and differentiated, described earlier in this Appendix.
Second, I use the concordance from NAICS codes (at the 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6-digit
level) to the I-O codes, which is available from the BEA. Although this concordance
often yields a many-to-one mapping, most of the times an I-O code is matched
with different NAICS codes which are characterized by a unique Rauch category.
Conversely, when different Rauch categories map into a given I-O code (or when
the concordance method does not match an I-O code with any NAICS code), I
either classify the I-O codes manually or leave them unclassified. As a result of
this procedure, I classify 91 (out of 98) I-O codes as either nondifferentiated or
differentiated.
Finally, I use the bridge tables that map the PCE categories into the final
use categories in the I-O accounts, which are available from the BEA. These bridge
tables feature, among other information, the I-O commodities included in each PCE
category and the value of the transactions in purchasers’ prices of each I-O commod-
ity. The latest annual tables at the most disaggregated level (or “detail level”, in
BEA’s terminology) correspond to 2007. I use data at the detail level from that year
to map the Rauch categories into the PCE categories. Specifically, if at least 70% of
the total purchasers’ value for a PCE category correspond to, say, nondifferentiated
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I-O commodities, then that PCE category is labeled as nondifferentiated. If this
70% criterion is not satisfied, the PCE category is left unclassified.
By combining the Rauch classification of PCE categories with the NIPA an-
nual data for PCE by type of product (NIPA table 2.4.6U), I calculate the average
expenditure shares in nondifferentiated and differentiated consumption goods for
the period 1999–2012. This calculation ignores the PCE categories which are clas-
sified neither as nondifferentiated nor as differentiated to ensure that the sectoral
expenditure shares in the model add up to one. (In the raw data, the unclassified
PCE categories represent roughly 10% of total nondurable consumption.)
Calibration of sectoral import shares. I calculate the sectoral import
shares 1 − ψs as the sum product of import shares of sector-s goods and the rela-
tive weights of these sector-s goods in their respective sectoral consumption basket.
A detailed explanation of the procedure is in order. I use the import share esti-
mates for nondurable major PCE categories reported by McCulley (2011) for 2009.
These major PCE categories are: ‘Food and beverages purchased off-premises con-
sumption’, ‘Clothing and footwear’, ‘Gasoline and other energy goods’, and ‘Other
Nondurables’.
I compute the differentiated and nondifferentiated content of each major PCE
product using the Rauch classification of PCE categories at the detail level (de-
scribed earlier in this Appendix for the calculation of the sectoral expenditure shares)
and the value of transactions in purchasers’ prices within each PCE category at the
detail level.1 Due to the lack of disaggregated information, I assume the same im-
1The NIPA tables for PCE by type of product published by the BEA imply the following
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port shares for both the nondifferentiated and the differentiated content within each
type of major product.
For each major PCE category, the relative weight of sector-s goods in the
sectoral consumption basket is calculated as the ratio of the relative weight of sector-
s goods in PCE, to the relative weight of the overall sector-s consumption basket in
PCE. As part of these calculations I use the shares of PCE by major type of product
reported by McCulley (2011).
Calibration of sectoral distribution margins. To compute the sectoral
distribution margins, I use the 2007 bridge tables at the detail level that map the
PCE categories into the final use categories in the I-O accounts (source: BEA). These
tables show the I-O commodities included in each PCE category, the value of the
transactions purchasers’ prices, and the associated transportation costs and trade
margins. As explained above for the calculation of the sectoral expenditure shares,
I develop a classification of I-O commodities as differentiated and nondifferentiated
goods. Relying on this classification and on the 2007 PCE bridge tables, I compute
the baseline sectoral distribution margins in the way detailed in the text.
The BEA also reports annual PCE bridge tables at a more aggregate level
(“summary level”, in BEA’s terminology), which are available for the period 1997–
2012. Using these data, I compute annual sectoral distribution margins for ro-
bustness purposes. The results are summarized in Figure A.1. For this exercise,
the summary-level PCE categories corresponding to the following nondurable ma-
mapping from the major PCE products to the NIPA lines for detail-level PCE categories: ‘Food
and beverages...’: lines 72-101; ‘Clothing and footwear’: lines 103-110; ‘Gasoline and other energy
goods’: lines 112-117; and ‘Other Nondurables’: lines 120-142.
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Figure A.1
Aggregate sectoral distribution margins, 1997–2012
Notes: The graph relies on the BEA’s bridge tables at the summary level that map PCE
categories into final use categories in the I-O accounts. Based on my own Rauch classification of
I-O commodities, the PCE categories that belong to the following major products are treated as
nondifferentiated: ‘Food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption’, ‘Gasoline and
other energy goods’, and ‘Tobacco’; while the PCE categories that belong to the following major
products are treated as differentiated: ‘Clothing and footwear’, ‘Pharmaceutical and other
medical products’, ‘Household supplies’, ‘Personal care products’, and ‘Magazines, newspapers,
and stationery’. The aggregate sectoral distribution margin is calculated as the sum of the
wholesale and retail distribution margins and transportation costs, divided by the sum of all
output valued at purchaser’s prices, across all final use categories in each sector’s I-O accounts.
See further details in the text.
jor PCE products are coded as nondifferentiated: ‘Food and beverages purchased
for off-premises consumption’, ‘Gasoline and other energy goods’, and ‘Tobacco’;
whereas the PCE categories that belong to the following major products are coded
as differentiated: ‘Clothing and footwear’, ‘Pharmaceutical and other medical prod-
ucts’, ‘Household supplies’, ‘Personal care products’, and ‘Magazines, newspapers,
and stationery’.2
2The PCE categories within the remaining major product ‘Recreational Items’ are left un-
classified because the nondifferentiated content of this major product is virtually the same as its
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A.2 Model: market clearing conditions
Total labor in the nontradable sector is given by LzH,t ≡
∫ 1
0
LzH,t(i)di. Using
this definition along with the technology function for nontradables, the goods market
clearing condition in that sector can be written as:
LzH,t =
(
CzH,t +D
z
H,t
) ∫ 1
0
(
P zH,t(i)
P zH,t
)−ξ
di,
where the integral term is a measure of sectoral price dispersion (which is equal to
zero to a first-order approximation in a neighborhood of the zero-inflation steady
state), and where market clearing in the distribution sector implies:
DzH,t =
∑
s=N,D
κs
[
CHHs,t
∫ 1
0
(
PHHs,t(i)
PHHs,t
)−σs
di+ CFHs,t
∫ 1
0
(
PFHs,t(i)
PFHs,t
)−σs
di
]
.
Likewise, let total labor in tradable sector s be given by LHs,t ≡
∫ 1
0
LHs,t(i)di.
Using this expression and the production function for sector s, the corresponding
goods market clearing condition is:
AHs,tLHs,t = CHHs,t
∫ 1
0
(
PHHs,t(i)
PHHs,t
)−σs
di+ CHFs,t
∫ 1
0
(
PHFs,t(i)
PHFs,t
)−σs
di.
Finally, market clearing in the aggregate labor market requires:
LH,t =
∑
s=N,D
LHs,t + L
z
H,t.
An analogous set of goods and labor market clearing conditions hold for the
Foreign country.
differentiated content, as revealed by my Rauch-type classification of PCE categories at the detail
level.
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A.3 Additional experiments
The analysis on the relative importance of nominal rigidities and variable
markups is mainly based on the comparison of impulse responses between the base-
line model (benchmark calibration) and two alternative models. This appendix
shows that the key conclusions are robust to the consideration of further alternative
models, which feature different parameterizations. I first consider two scenarios that
assume the same (non-zero) distribution margin in both sectors, implying that the
variability of markups is not as different across sectors as in the baseline model. I
also compute another model with a unique frequency of price adjustment in both
sectors.
The first of these additional models sets the target for the distribution mar-
gin to xN = xD = 0.49, the value for the differentiated goods sector employed in
the benchmark calibration. The second model uses xN = xD = 0.42, the value
for the distribution margin in the nondifferentiated goods sector employed in the
benchmark calibration.3 The third model assumes θN = θD = 0.6, the value for the
Calvo parameter in the nondifferentiated goods sector employed in the benchmark
calibration. Summary measures for the impulse responses based on these models are
displayed in columns 5, 6, and 7 of Table A.2, respectively. To facilitate comparison
with previous findings, the first four columns of this Table replicate Table 1.4.
In columns 5 and 6, we observe that regardless of the specific values assumed
3The first model implies the following values for the sectoral inputs of distribution services and
the sectoral markup elasticities: κN = 2.14, κD = 5.67, ΓN = 0.78, and ΓD = 2.88. The second
model implies: κN = 1.32, κD = 2.41, ΓN = 0.48, and ΓD = 1.22.
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for the distribution margins, the responses of our variables of interest (i.e., relative
prices and quantities) to a monetary shock are similar. Moreover, the magnitudes
of the responses under these two models are only marginally smaller (in absolute
value) relative to the baseline model (column 2). These results are in line with the
conclusion that the variable markup channel plays a limited quantitative role.
The responses observed under a homogeneous degree of nominal rigidity across
sectors show that with a low Calvo parameter (column 7), the model predicts larger
declines in relative prices and quantities than with a high Calvo parameter (column
4). That said, the responses in column 7 are appreciably subdued relative to the
baseline model. This finding confirms that the differences in the sectoral frequency
of price changes constitute the central mechanism behind the main quantitative
results.
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Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Data sources
Table B.1
Data sources
Trade and country-level data
Variable Source
World export and import data The Center for International Data
US export data The Center for International Data
World export price index IFS database
Real GDP in US Dollars WDI database
Bilateral real exchange rate Penn World Table 8.1
Free trade agreements de Sousa (2012)
Bilateral geographic distance CEPII distance database
Private credit to GDP ratio Financial Development and Structure database
Rule of law Worldwide Governance Indicators database
Banking crisis dates Laeven and Valencia (2013)
Sovereign debt crisis dates Laeven and Valencia (2013)
Industry data
Variable Source
Complexity index Chor (2010) (based on Nunn, 2007)
Concentration index Chor (2010) (based on Levchenko, 2007)
Collection Effectiveness Index Credit Research Foundation
Cash conversion cycle Compustat
Asset tangibility Compustat (based on Braun, 2003)
Cyclicality Durability classification by Gomes et al. (2009)
Differentiation Product classification by Rauch (1999)
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B.2 Data from the National Summary of Domestic Trade Receivables
The National Summary of Domestic Trade Receivables (NSDTR) data are in
readable PDF format, so we first transcribe these files to machine-readable format.
The NSDTR’s Collection Effectiveness Index (CEI) is constructed as follows:
CEI =
Beginning total receiv. + (Quarterly credit sales/3) - Ending total receiv.
Beginning total receiv. + (Quarterly credit sales/3) - Ending current receiv.
where:
‘Beginning (Ending) total receiv.’: Receivables balance at beginning (end) of
3-month period being reported. Considers all domestic open invoices and notes
receivable, deferred billings or datings, past-due billings, credits, unapplied cash,
suspense accounts, charge backs, invoice deductions, bankruptcies, claims, disputes,
litigation and accounts placed for collections.
‘Quarterly credit sales’: Total invoiced receivable for the 3-month period re-
ported. Includes freight, taxes, and containers.
‘Ending current receiv.’: Portion of receivables (domestic open accounts and
notes) not yet due as of end of period according to terms, including datings and
deferred items. We take median values across quarters by 4-digit SIC industry.
On each quarter, the survey includes only industries that report a minimum of
3 responding firms. For more detailed information about the NSDTR, see http:
//www.crfonline.org/surveys/surveys.asp.
Table B.2 summarizes the 10 most and 10 least collection-effective industries.
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B.3 Sensitivity analysis: additional results
Table B.3
Effects of crises and contract vulnerability on trade across
countries and industries: controlling for financial vulnerability.
Dependent variable: Ln(bilateral sectoral imports)
(1) (2) (3)
Recession alone -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.055***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Fin.Crisis alone -0.011 -0.011 -0.004
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Recession & Fin.Crisis -0.195*** -0.195*** -0.189***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Recession alone × Complexity -0.127***
(0.021)
Fin.Crisis alone × Complexity -0.045
(0.032)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Complexity -0.220***
(0.032)
Recession alone × Concentration -0.242***
(0.038)
Fin.Crisis alone × Concentration -0.091*
(0.054)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Concentration -0.337***
(0.059)
Recession alone × Uncollectible -0.249***
(0.051)
Fin.Crisis alone × Uncollectible -0.066
(0.079)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Uncollectible -0.394***
(0.093)
Recession alone × TangAssets 0.012 0.081** 0.156***
(0.026) (0.033) (0.044)
Fin.Crisis alone × TangAssets -0.027 -0.005 -0.000
(0.027) (0.039) (0.053)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × TangAssets 0.010 0.144*** 0.140*
(0.036) (0.047) (0.076)
Observations 5,538,895 5,538,895 2,077,588
R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.903
Importer-Exporter-Industry FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Notes: See notes to Table 2.5. Standard errors are clustered by destination-year,
with ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
The regressions include the same control variables as the baseline estimation
(see Table 2.5). ‘TangAssets’ is demeaned.
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Table B.4
Effects of crises and contract vulnerability on trade across countries and
industries: controlling for cyclicality. Dependent variable: Ln(bilateral
sectoral imports)
(1) (2) (3)
Recession alone -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.057***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Fin.Crisis alone -0.011 -0.011 -0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Recession & Fin.Crisis -0.195*** -0.196*** -0.190***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Recession alone × Complexity -0.125***
(0.025)
Fin.Crisis alone × Complexity -0.036
(0.036)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Complexity -0.221***
(0.037)
Recession alone × Concentration -0.262***
(0.045)
Fin.Crisis alone × Concentration -0.092
(0.062)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Concentration -0.391***
(0.066)
Recession alone × Uncollectible -0.249***
(0.054)
Fin.Crisis alone × Uncollectible -0.071
(0.082)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Uncollectible -0.410***
(0.094)
Recession alone × Durables (with NX) -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.039***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Fin.Crisis alone × Durables (with NX) 0.005 0.005 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Recession & Fin.Crisis × Durables (with NX) -0.012 -0.017* -0.016
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
Observations 5,538,895 5,538,895 2,077,588
R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.903
Importer-Exporter-Product FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Notes: See notes to Table 2.5. Standard errors are clustered by destination-year,
with ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The
regressions include the same control variables as the baseline estimation (see Table
2.5).
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